The German NetzDG as Role Model or Cautionary Tale? Implications for the Debate on Social Media Liability by Zurth, Patrick
Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law 
Journal 
Volume 31 XXXI 
Number 4 Article 4 
2021 
The German NetzDG as Role Model or Cautionary Tale? 
Implications for the Debate on Social Media Liability 
Patrick Zurth 
Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich (LMU), Patrick.Zurth@jura.uni-muenchen.de 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/iplj 
 Part of the International Law Commons, and the Internet Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Patrick Zurth, The German NetzDG as Role Model or Cautionary Tale? Implications for the Debate on 
Social Media Liability, 31 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 1084 (2021). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/iplj/vol31/iss4/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law Journal 
by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, 
please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
The German NetzDG as Role Model or Cautionary Tale? Implications for the 
Debate on Social Media Liability 
Cover Page Footnote 
Dr. iur., LL.M. (Stanford). Postdoctoral Fellow at the Chair for Private Law and Intellectual Property Law 
with Information- and IT-Law (GRUR-chair) (Prof. Dr. Matthias Leistner, LL.M. (Cambridge)) at Ludwig 
Maximilian University of Munich, Germany. Thanks to Professor David Freeman Engstrom, Abhilasha Vij, 
Jasmin Hohmann, Shazana Rohr, and the editorial board of the Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and 
Entertainment Law Journal for helpful comments and assistance. 









What can be done against discrimination, bullying, insults,  
and the spread of dangerous fake news on social media platforms?  
While platforms in the United States enjoy broad discretion on  
how to approach that issue, there are both legal and political de-
bates regarding social media regulation. Germany, by contrast, ad-
vances the opposite approach: requiring social media providers to 
block or remove illegal content. The Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz 
(“NetzDG,” “Network Enforcement Act,” the “Act”) of 2017 out-
lines a specific procedure for implementing such a claim. The Act is 
the first of its kind in the western democratic states. Other countries 
have invoked or discussed whether to follow the German example, 
which could make NetzDG a pioneer in its strategy of combating 
hate speech and fake news. This Article is intended to explain the 
background, mode of operation, and reception of the NetzDG.  
Furthermore, this Article will attempt to clear up misunderstandings 
and discuss current developments around this Act. A main purpose 
of this Article is to examine whether the Act is a suitable prototype 
for the United States Congress to introduce regarding platform lia-
bility and to determine which alternatives are available at hand.  
To that end, the Article evaluates the constitutional leeway for a 
regulation of social media. The Article concludes that Congress 
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could establish principles and mechanisms similar to the NetzDG 
which, despite its room for improvement, is better than its reputa-
tion. Data and recent judgments indicate that the debate surround-
ing this system, however, was based on exaggerated assumptions 
and misunderstandings. Therefore, it is hopeful that the United 
States averts the defected discussion surrounding the NetzDG and 
draws positive and negative lessons from it. 
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INTRODUCTION 
When Samantha Jespersen googled her name, the very first re-
sult that appeared was a Facebook business page called “Samantha 
Rae Anna Jespersen’s Butthole.”1 Even though Jespersen reported 
this unfortunate page several times, the forum remained on Face-
book until January 2020 when the social media platform finally took 
it down.2 The Facebook page was created in 2012 when Jespersen 
was fifteen years old; however, she did not discover it until 2015.3 
The page said, “This unofficial Page was created because people  
on Facebook have shown interest in this place or business. It’s not  
affiliated with or endorsed by anyone associated with Samantha Rae 
 
1 See Katie Notopolous, Facebook Won’t Remove This Woman’s Butthole as a Business 
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Anna Jespersen’s Butthole.”4 A pin on the map indicated the correct 
location of her former home.5 Everyone interested in her, whether 
for personal or business reasons, would see this as the first Google 
Search result.6 It is troubling that it took Facebook eight years to 
take action. 
Cases like Samantha Jespersen’s seem to call for strict regula-
tion of social media. The fact that platforms introduced self-imposed 
guidelines about impermissible content on their sites and perform 
content moderation (i.e., monitoring posts and comments for com-
pliance with their rules) does not solve the problem in cases where 
they simply do not act. For these cases, German law provides for a 
special complaint procedure. Social networks had until January 1, 
2018 to implement all required procedures.7 The novel NetzDG im-
poses further obligations on large social media platforms, such as 
requiring publication of user complaint transparency reports.8 
This regulatory approach has attracted attention in many other 





7 According to Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz [NetzDG] [Network Enforcement Act], 
July 12, 2017, Art. 3, the Act came into force on Oct. 1, 2017. According to Art. 1, § 6, 
para. 2, the procedures pursuant to section 3 had to be introduced within three months after 
that. In this Article, quotations of NetzDG are taken from the English translation, available 
at https://perma.cc/UE9G-E9VB. However, it is neither an official nor an optimal 
translation. It omits, for example, STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB] [PENAL CODE], § 201a in the 
list of provisions in NETZDG § 1, para. 3. 
8 See Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz [NetzDG] [Network Enforcement Act], July 12, 
2017, §§ 2, 3 [hereinafter “NetzDG”], available at https://www.bmjv.de/SharedDocs/ 
Gesetzgebungsverfahren/Dokumente/NetzDG_engl.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=2 
[https://perma.cc/56SV-UY46]. 
9 See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Free Speech Is a Triangle, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 2011, 2012–
13, 2016, 2018, 2030 (2018); Imara McMillan, Enforcement Through the Network: The 
Network Enforcement Act and Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, 
20 CHI. J. INT’L L. 252 (2019); Laura E. Moon, Note, A New Role for Social Network 
Providers: NetzDG and the Communications Decency Act, 28 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 623 (2019); Dawn C. Nunziato, The Marketplace of Ideas Online, 94 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 1519, 1521–22, 1533–38 (2019); Mark Scott & Janosch Delcker, Free Speech vs. 
Censorship in Germany, POLITICO (Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.politico.eu/article/germany-
hate-speech-netzdg-facebook-youtube-google-twitter-free-speech/ 
[https://perma.cc/D2VF-LWLF]; Rebecca Zipursky, Note, Nuts About Netz: The Network 
Enforcement Act and Freedom of Expression, 42 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1325 (2019). 
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with NetzDG and demands from a member of parliament, the United 
Kingdom debated copying the German act.10 On May 13, 2020, the 
French lower house parliament11 partially followed the German ex-
ample and passed a law obliging social media platforms to render 
content inaccessible that manifestly infringes specified provisions 
within twenty-four hours of notification.12 The EU intends to har-
monize the duty of platforms to take down content with its proposed 
Digital Services Act.13 This draft regulation proposed on December 
15, 2020 is intended to compel online intermediaries, including so-
cial networks, to remove illegal content and provide, among many 
other things, not only a notice and action mechanism but also an 
internal complaint handling system.14 Less like the NetzDG, how-
ever, is the EU Commission’s proposal for a regulation on prevent-
ing the dissemination of terrorist content online by allowing govern-
ments to order the removal of such content.15 On January 1, 2021, 
the Kommunikationsplattformen-Gesetz (“KoPl-G”, “Communica-
tion Platform Act”) came into force in Austria, obliging  
social media providers to remove illegal content, as well as to  
 
10 See Laurence Dodds, British MPs Call for German-Style Law to Block Hate Speech 
on Social Media, TELEGRAPH (July 28, 2018), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/ 
2018/07/28/british-mps-call-german-style-law-block-hate-speech-social-media/ 
[https://perma.cc/9DJB-BLS6]. 
11 Assemblée nationale (National Assembly). 
12 See Marc Schuler and Benjamin Znaty, New Law to Fight Online Hate Speech to 
Reshape Notice, Take Down and Liability Rules in France, TAYLORWESSING (May 21, 
2020), https://www.taylorwessing.com/en/insights-and-events/insights/2020/05/new-law-
to-fight-online-hate-speech-in-france [https://perma.cc/UB74-FMGZ]. Various language 
versions of the initial draft from July 9, 2019 are available at 
https://ec.europa.eu/growth/tools-databases/tris/en/index.cfm/search/?trisaction=search.de 
tail&year=2019&num=412&mLang=EN [https://perma.cc/DYG6-5W2P]. 
13 See Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a 
Single Market for Digital Services (Digital Services Act) and Amending Directive 
2000/31/EC, COM (2020) 825 final (Dec. 15, 2020). 
14 Id. 
15 See Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
Preventing the Dissemination of Terrorist Content Online, COM (2018) 640 final (Sept. 
12, 2018). On December 10, 2020 the European Parliament and the Council (the body 
representing the 27 Member States) agreed on that proposal. European Commission Press 
Release IP/20/2372, Security Union: Commission Welcomes Political Agreement on 
Removing Terrorist Content Online (Dec. 10, 2020), available at https://ec.europa.eu/ 
commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_2372 [https://perma.cc/VE74-LG8T].  
The regulation must now be formally adopted by those two legislative bodies. Id.  
2021] THE GERMAN NETZDG 1089 
 
supply reporting and verification procedures resembling those of 
NetzDG.16 
As was to be expected, the NetzDG triggered a major debate in 
Germany and other countries. Sharp criticism included referring to 
Germany’s overall agenda on dealing with propaganda on the Inter-
net as a “cautionary tale.”17 Unfortunately, some criticism was 
partly based on misconceptions. The misleading summary of the 
Act, issued by UN Special Rapporteur David Kaye on the promotion 
and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, 
cautioned that the NetzDG “would impose fines up to 50 million 
EUR on social media companies that fail to remove undesirable con-
tent from their platforms.”18 By the same token, referring to the 
NetzDG as “drastic legislation requiring social media sites like Fa-
cebook and Twitter to remove false news, defamatory hate speech, 
and other unlawful content within twenty-four hours of receiving 
notice of the same, upon pain of multi-million-euro fines”19 is falla-
cious for several reasons, as this Article will explain. 
The purpose of this Article is to prevent misunderstandings in 
the debate on a change of law in the United States and draw conclu-
sions from Germany’s experiences. Currently, in the United States, 
Internet platforms are protected against any liability for user posts. 
According to Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act 
 
16 See KOMMUNIKATIONSPLATTFORMEN-GESETZ [KOPL-G] [COMMUNICATION 
PLATFORMS ACT] BUNDESGESETZBLATT [BGBL] No. 151/2020 (Austria), available at 
https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/GeltendeFassung.wxe?Abfrage=Bundesnormen&Gesetzesnum
mer=20011415 [https://perma.cc/AQ3W-83BM]. On the law in general and its similarities 
with NetzDG, see Gregor Fischer et al., Così fan tutte: Some Comments on Austria’s Draft 
Communications Platforms Act (Graz Law, Working Paper No 05-2020, 2020). 
17 See Lisa-Maria N. Neudert, Germany: A Cautionary Tale, in COMPUTATIONAL 
PROPAGANDA: POLITICAL PARTIES, POLITICIANS, AND POLITICAL MANIPULATION ON SOCIAL 
MEDIA 153, 179 (Samuel C. Woolley & Philip N. Howard eds., 2018) (“Germany has 
emerged as a cautionary authority on concerns over computational propaganda.”). 
18 See David Kaye (Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression), 
Mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to 
Freedom of Opinion and Expression, Reference OL DEU 1/2017, at 1 (June 1, 2018), 
available at https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Opinion/Legislation/OL-DEU-1-
2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/JGE2-2HNY]. 
19 Nunziato, supra note 9, at 1521–22; accord Balkin, supra note 9, at 2013 (“It requires 
social media companies to take down many different kinds of speech, including hate 
speech, within twenty-four hours of a complaint.”). 
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(“CDA”),20 these platforms have broad discretion on how to engage 
in content moderation. Both legal scholars and policymakers from 
both sides of the aisle, for different reasons, are attacking the CDA’s 
approach. Recent events fueled the debate on this provision. 
After large social networks were criticized for being too lenient 
on former President Donald Trump,21 a debate among those provid-
ers arose about how to deal with the President’s posts.22 On May 26, 
2020, Twitter, for the first time, took action by flagging a post for 
fact-checking when the President made unsubstantiated claims 
about mail-in voting.23 The President’s fury about commenting on 
his post resulted in an executive order, targeting social media’s blan-
ket immunity from liability for its users’ posts and causing a politi-
cal debate about CDA section.24 The order, issued on May 28, 2020, 
mandates a proposal for legislation and aims to fight “online censor-
ship” by restricting leeway under CDA section.25 As a result, on 
September 23, 2020, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) sent draft 
legislation to Congress to reform CDA Section 230 so platforms 
could not be shielded from promoting, soliciting, and facilitating 
 
20 47 U.S.C. § 230 [hereinafter CDA Section 230]. 
21 E.g., Facebook apparently privileged then-presidential candidate Donald Trump 
during his 2016 campaign by leaving posts untouched that actually had violated the 
platform’s standards; Facebook was severely criticized for being too lenient with him. See 
Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes Governing Online 
Speech, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1598, 1655 (2018). 
22 See Quint Forgey, Zuckerberg, Dorsey Spar Over Twitter’s Flagging of Trump’s 
Tweets, POLITICO (May 28, 2020), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/05/28/ 
zuckerberg-dorsey-spar-over-twitters-flagging-of-trumps-tweets-286881 [https://perma. 
cc/L8AS-67SL]; Dylan Byers & Jason Abbruzzese, Facebook Employees Go Public with 
Disagreement over Zuckerberg’s Handling of Trump, NBC NEWS (June 1, 2020), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-news/facebook-employees-go-public-disagreement-
over-zuckerberg-s-handling-trump-n1220961 [https://perma.cc/7EG4-WRDZ]. 
23 See Jason Silverstein, Twitter Flags Trump Tweet with Fact-Checking Label for First 
Time, CBS NEWS (May 27, 2020), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/twitter-adds-fact-
check-warning-trump-tweets/ [https://perma.cc/6RKH-ZU3J]. 
24 See Brian Fung et al., Trump Signs Executive Order Targeting Social Media 
Companies, CNN (May 28, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/05/28/politics/trump-
twitter-social-media-executive-order/index.html [https://perma.cc/P9LM-FC2U]. 
25 See Exec. Order No. 13,925, 85 Fed. Reg. 34,079 (May 28, 2020).  
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harmful criminal activity and have limited leeway in removing con-
tent.26 Interactive computer service providers would now even be 
required “to offer easily accessible and apparent mechanisms for us-
ers to notify providers of unlawful content.”27 
Since the draft legislation, Congress has not debated on abolish-
ing or amending CDA Section 230. Congress even overruled Presi-
dent Trump’s veto against the National Defense Authorization Act 
(“NDAA”), an annual defense funding bill, which was intended to 
wring abolition of CDA Section 230, without taking any legislative 
action on that provision.28 Given that several congressional lawmak-
ers already made proposals to amend CDA Section 230,29 and Pres-
ident Biden criticized and advocated revoking it,30 further legislative 
action can be expected in the upcoming term. Regardless, the polit-
ical debate was recently fueled by Twitter and Facebook’s perma-
nent suspension of President Trump’s accounts in response to his 
numerous claims of election fraud and his role in the storming of the 
 
26 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE’S REVIEW OF SECTION 230 OF THE 
COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT OF 1996 (Sept. 23, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/ 
archives/ag/department-justice-s-review-section-230-communications-decency-act-1996 
[https://perma.cc/J265-H8CM]. The DOJ also provided a document detailing its edits 
section by section. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SECTION BY SECTION (Sept. 23, 2020), available 
at https://www.justice.gov/file/1319326/download [https://perma.cc/2X7S-SEJ3] 
[hereinafter SECTION BY SECTION]. 
27 See SECTION BY SECTION, supra note 26, at 2. 
28 See Grace Segers, Senate Overrides Trump’s Veto of Defense Bill, CBS NEWS (Jan. 
2, 2021), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/senate-overrides-trump-veto-defense-bill/ 
[https://perma.cc/XQ2U-F7ET]. On January 1, 2021, the Senate voted 81 to 13, with a two-
thirds vote required to overturn the veto. On December 28, 2020, the House had already 
voted to overturn the veto with a majority of 322 to 87. 
29 See infra Section I.B. 
30 See Interview by N.Y. Times Editorial Board with President Joe Biden (Jan. 17, 
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/01/17/opinion/joe-biden-nytimes-
interview.html [https://perma.cc/TKQ4-ARP5] (“The idea that it’s a tech company is that 
Section 230 should be revoked, immediately should be revoked, number one. For 
Zuckerberg and other platforms.”). 
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Capitol on January 6, 2021.31 Those decisions, once again, ignited a 
dispute on social media’s power and free speech.32 
Thus, after twenty-five years of total immunity for Internet plat-
forms,33 the United States vigorously debates social media’s legal 
and social responsibility in a modern Internet. This Article contrib-
utes to that debate by discussing the German approach as a potential 
role model for a new US federal law. To that end, the Article ad-
dresses two different ways to regulate networks: (1) imposing rules 
externally, as the NetzDG does, and (2) promoting internal regula-
tion by means of provider-imposed standards. Both shape the legal 
status quo in Germany. 
Part I expounds upon the contemporary broad immunity ac-
corded to social media providers in the United States. Next, Part II 
and III frame Germany’s approach with the NetzDG. Subsequently, 
Part IV addresses platforms’ self-imposed standards and explains 
how German law deals with them. Part V goes on to discuss the dif-
ferent policy issues on the regulation of social media. Finally, Part 
VI describes the constitutional framework for a potential reform in 
the United States and makes proposals drawn from the NetzDG. 
 
I. “GOOD” SAMARITANS UNDER CDA § 230 
This Article will first outline how differently the United States 
currently regulates social network liability and what discussions are 
taking place before examining how the NetzDG may affect this de-
bate. Under current US law, Internet platforms are not exposed to 
any obligations. First, the statute negates a platform’s duty to take 
 
31 See Twitter Inc., Permanent Suspension of @realDonaldTrump, TWITTER (Jan. 8, 
2021), https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2020/suspension.html [https://per 
ma.cc/DCT7-WM8L]; Mark Zuckerberg, FACEBOOK (Jan. 7, 2021, 7:47 AM), 
https://www.facebook.com/zuck/posts/10112681480907401 [https://perma.cc/TW56-
MYS7]. 
32 See Lauren Aratani, Trump Twitter: Republicans and Democrats Split Over Freedom 
of Speech, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 9, 2021), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/ 
2021/jan/09/trump-twitter-republicans-democrats [https://perma.cc/X6E4-B4ZS]. 
33 CDA Section 230 was enacted in 1996. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. On 
its broad protection, see supra Section I.A. 
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down illegitimate content. It reads, “[n]o provider or user of an in-
teractive computer service34 shall be treated as the publisher or 
speaker of any information provided by another information content 
provider.”35 
Second, social networks cannot be held accountable for taking 
down content they do not want to post, irrespective of the providers’ 
intentions or reasons—so users do not have any remedies at their 
disposal if an Internet platform, acting in good faith, bans content: 
No provider or user of an interactive computer ser-
vice shall be held liable on account of any action vol-
untarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or 
availability of material that the provider or user con-
siders to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, exces-
sively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, 
whether or not such material is constitutionally pro-
tected.36 
Thus, CDA Section 230’s protection is twofold: (1) it grants 
“immunity both for the content they moderate” and (2) “the content 
they miss.”37 The statute provides for blanket immunity against civil 
claims in various fields38 only excluding criminal law, intellectual 
 
34 An interactive computer service is defined as “any information service, system, or 
access software provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a 
computer server, including specifically a service or system that provides access to the 
Internet and such systems operated or services offered by libraries or educational 
institutions.” CDA § 230(f)(2). 
35 CDA § 230(c)(1). An “information content provider” is one who creates or develops 
content. See id. § 230(f)(3) (whereas an “interactive computer service” then provides or 
enables access). 
36 Id. § 230(c)(2)(A). 
37 See James Grimmelmann, The Virtues of Moderation, 17 YALE J.L. & TECH. 42, 103 
(2015). 
38 See id.; Tim Wu, Will Artificial Intelligence Eat the Law? The Rise of Hybrid Social-
Ordering Systems, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 2001, 2009 (2019). 
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property law, electronic surveillance law, and sex trafficking law.39 
Thus, the provision is all-encompassing.40 
Congress took a different approach to determining what Internet 
content violates copyright law. According to Section 512(c)(1) of 
the Copyright Act, a service provider’s41 immunity necessitates that 
it “does not have actual knowledge” of the infringement, “is not 
aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is 
apparent,” and upon notification of an infringement “acts expedi-
tiously to remove, or disable access to, the material” and does not, 
despite control over the activity, “receive a financial benefit directly 
attributable to the infringing activity.”42 Hence, the infringed party 
can notify the Internet platform which de facto leads to the pro-
vider’s obligation to take down illegal content—a notice-and-
takedown system.43 On the contrary, under the CDA, a notice does 
not compel any action by the platform.44 
A.  Internet’s Footing: Trajectory, Purpose, and Scope of the 
Blanket Immunity 
Many consider CDA Section 230 to be of paramount importance 
for the past and future development of the Internet,45 culminating in 
 
39 See CDA §§ 230(e)(1)–(5). The DOJ’s draft in September 2020 proposed to further 
exempt antitrust law from CDA Section 230 immunity. See SECTION BY SECTION, supra 
note 26, at 2. 
40 See Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 
F.3d 666, 671 (7th Cir. 2008) (refusing to exclude violations of the Fair Housing Act from 
the immunity’s scope). 
41 A service provider is “a provider of online services or network access, or the operator 
of facilities therefor.” 17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1)(B). 
42 Id. § 512(c)(1). 
43 The notification must meet several requirements. See id. § 512(c)(3). As to the 
proceeding after receiving the notice and removing the content, see id. §§ 512(g)(2)–(3). 
44 See Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331–33 (4th Cir. 1997) (considering a 
distributor as a “publisher” under CDA section 230(c)(1)); Felix Wu, Collateral 
Censorship and the Limits of Intermediary Immunity, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 293, 318 
(2011) (“Except for a brief interlude in the California courts, no court has specifically 
adopted the view that notice undermines immunity.”). 
45 See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, The Future of Free Expression in a Digital Age, 36 PEPP. L. 
REV. 427, 436–37 (2009) (“Without something like the Section 230 immunity, it would be 
very risky to create social software that allows others to blog or publish, much less create 
a social networking site….The Internet’s largely open networks and legal rules, like 
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a characterization of the provision’s wording as “The Twenty-Six 
Words That Created the Internet.”46 The section’s relevance and 
positive effects are so evident that even its critics concede that such 
benefits exist.47 The legal situation prior to CDA Section 230’s en-
actment in 199648 sheds light on the assumption that the statute 
played a major role in watering the delicate little plant that was the 
early stages of the Internet industry. After the Southern District of 
New York initially held that a provider was not liable for defamatory 
content because it was a mere distributer with neither knowledge nor 
reason to know of the statements since it had not engaged in any 
content moderation,49 Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services 
Co. later made lawmakers sit up and take notice.50 Even though de-
livered by a lower state court, a major threat was identified in this 
 
Section 230, have helped ensure a remarkably diverse ecology of applications, services, 
and content.”); Note, Section 230 as First Amendment Rule, 131 HARV. L REV. 2027, 2039 
(2018); Jeff Kosseff, Defending Section 230: The Value of Intermediary Immunity, 15 J. 
TECH. L. & POL’Y 123, 125 (2010) (“Section 230 has allowed the Internet to flourish as an 
open medium in which all consumers-rather than just the websites’ employees-provide 
content. If websites were not immune for third-party content, the Internet likely would not 
be as open as it is today.”); Elizabeth Nolan Brown, Section 230 Is the Internet’s First 
Amendment. Now Both Republicans and Democrats Want to Take It Away, REASON (July 
29, 2019), https://reason.com/2019/07/29/section-230-is-the-internets-first-amendment-
now-both-republicans-and-democrats-want-to-take-it-away/ [https://perma.cc/CRA9-
9JHB] (“The future of free speech—and a lot more—may depend on preserving Section 
230.”). 
46 See generally JEFF KOSSEFF, THE TWENTY-SIX WORDS THAT CREATED THE INTERNET 
(1st ed. 2019).  
47 E.g., Danielle Keats Citron & Benjamin Wittes, The Internet Will Not Break: Denying 
Bad Samaritans § 230 Immunity, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 401, 404, 412–13 (2017) (“Section 
230 immunity has enabled innovation and expression beyond the imagination of the 
operators of early bulletin boards and computer service providers the provision was 
designed to protect.”); Rebecca Tushnet, Power Without Responsibility: Intermediaries 
and the First Amendment, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 985, 1009 (2008) (“[A]n important 
protection against unanticipated and practically uncontrollable liability for torts committed 
by individual users.”). 
48 See, e.g., Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1026–27 (9th Cir. 2003); Klonick, supra 
note 21, at 1604–05; Citron & Wittes, supra note 47, at 404–06; Madeline Byrd & 
Katherine J. Strandburg, CDA 230 for a Smart Internet, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 405, 407–08 
(2019); Wu, supra note 44, at 315–17; Kosseff, supra note 45, at 128–31. 
49 Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 141 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
50 See generally Stratton Oakmont Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 
323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995). 
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decision. The New York Supreme Court treated a provider as a pub-
lisher because it “exercised editorial control over the content of mes-
sages posted on its computer bulletin boards.”51 Because of this 
holding, Internet providers faced an intricate dilemma: exercising 
absolutely no moderation opened the door to illegal activities on 
their platforms, yet any (unsuccessful) attempt to prevent that could 
expose them to liability.52 As a result, they were rather discouraged 
from conducting content moderation.53 
Congress found an unambiguous solution for this predicament. 
The enacted provision’s purpose is twofold: (1) to “encourage plat-
forms to be ‘Good Samaritans’ and take an active role in removing 
offensive content” and (2) “also to avoid free speech problems.”54 
On one hand, the purpose of the provision is to promote content 
moderation.55 But on the other hand, statements of opinion must be 
protected from arbitrary censorship.56 Regardless, engaging in con-
tent moderation remains CDA Section 230’s purpose and is not a 
condition for blanket immunity from liability.57 Hence, regarding 
take down claims,58 the statute applies to both good and bad Samar-
itans.59 Having knowledge of illegal activity,60 encouraging the 
posting of illegal content,61 or even running a “meretricious business 
 
51 Id. at 2.  
52 Note, supra note 45, at 2028–29. 
53 Grimmelmann, supra note 37, at 103 (“Taken together, the decisions created a 
perverse disincentive to moderate.”). 
54 Klonick, supra note 21, at 1602; see also Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 
330–31 (4th Cir. 1997); Jones v. Dirty World Ent. Recordings, LLC, 755 F.3d 398, 407–
08 (6th Cir. 2014); Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1027–28 (9th Cir. 2003); Carafano v. 
Metrosplash.com, 339 F.3d 1119, 1122 (9th Cir. 2003). 
55 Klonick, supra note 21, at 1608. 
56 Id. 
57 The statute does not contain any restrictions in that respect. CDA § 230(c)(2)(A); see 
supra note 36 and accompanying text.  
58 CDA § 230(c)(1). 
59 Wu, supra note 38, at 2009; see also Citron & Wittes, supra note 47, at 408. 
60 See supra notes 43–44 and accompanying text. 
61 Jones v. Dirty World Ent. Recordings, LLC, 755 F.3d 398, 415–17 (6th Cir. 2014) 
(finding no material contribution to infringements through soliciting gossip); see also Byrd 
& Strandburg, supra note 48, at 410–11, 435 (“Courts have considered inducement-like 
arguments against CDA 230 immunity but mostly have not been persuaded by them. This 
is probably the right result under the current statute….”). 
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model”62 does not suffice to deny immunity under CDA Section 
230. Thus, courts tend to apply the provision broadly.63 
That being said, CDA Section 230’s shield is not absolute. Most 
notably, it only safeguards Internet providers against liability for 
foreign content and leaves accountability for people’s own state-
ments untouched—acting as “information content provider” that 
creates or develops content.64 A website will be found to participate 
in the development of unlawful content and thus be covered by the 
CDA Section 230 exception if it “contributes materially” to the un-
lawful conduct.65 A website can carry both the operator’s own con-
tent, for which they are responsible as the information content pro-
vider, and third parties’ content to which CDA Section 230’s im-
munity applies.66 In that regard, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
held that a rental platform was “not entitled to CDA immunity for 
the operation of its search system, which filters listings, or of its 
email notification system, which directs emails to subscribers ac-
cording to discriminatory criteria.”67 Yet, this search system was 
built on discriminatory parameters.68 It can be inferred that social 
media websites qualify for CDA Section 230’s privilege so long  
as their content moderation algorithms employ unbiased criteria  




62 Jane Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 29 (1st Cir. 2016) (protecting a 
website, which took an active role and was tailored to make sex trafficking easier, from 
liability). 
63 Id. at 19 (“There has been near-universal agreement that Section 230 should not be 
construed grudgingly.”); Jones, 755 F.3d at 408 (“[C]ourts have construed the immunity 
provisions in § 230 broadly.”); Almeida v. Amazon.com, Inc., 456 F.3d 1316, 1318 (11th 
Cir. 2006) (“The majority of federal circuits have interpreted [CDA § 230], to establish 
broad ‘federal immunity….’”). 
64 See CDA § 230(f)(3); see also Note, supra note 45, at 2029 (noting that the immunity 
exemption follows from the term “another” in Section 230(c)(1)). 
65 Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 
1168 (9th Cir. 2008). This test has been adopted by other circuits. See Jones, 755 F.3d at 
412–17. 
66 Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d at 1162–63; Jones, 755 F.3d at 408–09. 
67 Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d at 1167. 
68 Id. (“Roommate’s search function is similarly designed to steer users based on 
discriminatory criteria.”). 
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B. The Inescapable Debate 
In sum, CDA Section 230 provides for an utterly broad protec-
tion, leaving many dubious Internet platforms unaccountable and 
blocking victims’ paths for relief. This raises major questions as to 
how to restrict the CDA’s scope. Shielding bad Samaritans, who  
deliberately promote illicit actions online while lacking any relation 
to free speech, from legal remedies seems questionable when con-
sidering the provision’s initial purpose. Nevertheless, numerous 
voices still emphasize CDA Section 230’s importance and speak 
against any alterations.69 
Yet, many things have changed since 1996. Firstly, while many 
used to advocate and promote an unrestricted “open speech” Inter-
net, the public is now increasingly focused on a “healthy speech” 
approach—thus inching closer to the European approach.70 Some, 
however, often invoking the implications to freedom of speech, dis-
approve of stronger content moderation. 
Even though CDA Section 230 seemed untouchable for a long 
time, pressure is now coming from both political sides. In 2018, 
Democrat Senator Mark Warner from Virginia proposed to “make 
platforms liable for state-law torts (defamation, false light, public 
disclosure of private facts) for failure to take down deepfake or other 
 
69 E.g., Eric Goldman, Dear President Biden: You Should Save, Not Revoke, Section 230 
at 1 (Santa Clara Univ. Legal Studies Research Paper, Jan. 14, 2021) (“Section 230 has 
facilitated the emergence of Web 2.0—a universe of Internet services that help us 
communicate and engage with each other in powerful and novel ways. Many of the top 
Internet services depend on Section 230, and we rely on Section 230-enabled services 
hourly.”); Eric Goldman, Why Section 230 Is Better Than the First Amendment, 95 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. REFLECTIONS 33, 34 (2019) (“[R]educing Section 230’s immunity poses 
major risks to online free speech and the associated benefits to society.”); Eric Goldman, 
Why the State Attorneys General’s Assault on Internet Immunity Is a Terrible Idea, FORBES 
(June 27, 2013), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ericgoldman/2013/06/27/why-the-state-
attorneys-generals-assault-on-internet-immunity-is-a-terrible-idea/ [https://perma.cc/UU2 
J-MZWQ] (“Even a tiny legal change to Section 230 could upset the delicate balance that 
facilitated the extraordinary Internet boom over the past 15+ years.”); Brown, supra note 
45 (“Eroding the law would seriously jeopardize free speech for everyone, particularly 
marginalized groups whose ideas don’t sit easily with the mainstream. It would almost 
certainly kill upstarts trying to compete with entrenched tech giants.”); Balkin, supra note 
45, at 434; H. Brain Holland, In Defense on Online Intermediary Immunity: Facilitating 
Communities of Modified Exceptionalism, 56 U. KAN. L. REV. 369, 391–04 (2008). 
70 Wu, supra note 38, at 2009–10. Twitter is a good example of this shift. See id. at 2012; 
Klonick, supra note 21, at 1620–21, 1626–27. 
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manipulated audio/video content.”71 Approximately one year later, 
Republican Senator Josh Hawley from Missouri criticized CDA 
Section 230 as a “sweetheart deal” and introduced the Ending Sup-
port for Internet Censorship Act in order to require large providers 
to apply to the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) for immunity 
every two years—their “political neutrality” would be a major con-
sideration.72 
Additionally, in 2020, several other proposals followed. In 
March, the bipartisan Eliminating Abusive and Rampant Neglect of 
Interactive Technologies (“EARN IT”) Act suggested creating a 
panel consisting of nineteen members, the National Commission On 
Online Child Sexual Exploitation Prevention, in order to fight child 
exploitation materials.73 The bill passed the Committee on the Judi-
ciary on July 20, 2020.74 In June, several US Republican Senators 
proposed a Limiting Section 230 Immunity to Good Samaritans Act 
which would link CDA Section 230’s immunity to a duty of good 
faith.75 In the same month, the bipartisan Platform Accountability 
and Consumer Transparency (“PACT”) Act aimed to amend the 
blanket immunity as well—forcing online platforms to remove 
court-determined illegal content within twenty-four hours, requiring 
them to provide a complaint system that processes reports within 
fourteen days, and allowing users to appeal online platforms’ con-
tent.76 Several Republican politicians then attempted to drive the 
goal of restricting platforms’ discretion as to content moderation 
with the Stop the Censorship Act, introduced by eight Congressmen 
on July 29, 202077 and the Online Freedom and Viewpoint Diversity 
Act, introduced by three US Senators on September 8, 2020.78 
 
71 MARK WARNER, POTENTIAL POLICY PROPOSALS FOR REGULATION OF SOCIAL MEDIA 
AND TECHNOLOGY FIRMS 8 (2018), available at https://perma.cc/7ATN-X473. 
72 S. 1914, 116th Cong. (2019); see also Senator Hawley Introduces Legislation to 
Amend Section 230 Immunity for Big Tech Companies, SENATE.GOV (June 19, 2019), 
https://www.hawley.senate.gov/senator-hawley-introduces-legislation-amend-section-
230-immunity-big-tech-companies [https://perma.cc/SR7G-34HN]. 
73 S. 3398, 116th Cong. (2020). 
74 Id. 
75 S. 3983, 116th Cong. (2020). 
76 S. 4066, 116th Cong. (2020). 
77 H.R. 4027, 116th Cong. (2020). 
78 S. 4534, 116th Cong. (2020).  
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After all, “[c]onservatives claim that Section 230 gives tech 
companies a license to silence speech based on viewpoint. Liberals 
criticize Section 230 for giving platforms the freedom to profit from 
harmful speech and conduct.”79 Right-wing political attacks, based 
on the questionable assertion that social media would silence con-
servative voices,80 have peaked at the executive order of President 
Trump and the subsequent DOJ’s draft in September 2020.81 
However, even before this political debate, there were already 
various academic considerations to modernize CDA Section 230. 
While the criticism of some scholars is rather reserved,82 others 
clearly called for an amendment on a judicial or legislative level.83 
The platform’s broad discretion in moderating content is viewed 
critically.84 Several scholars, hence, argue in favor of a (modified) 
notice-and-takedown procedure.85 
 
79 Danielle Keats Citron & Mary Anne Franks, The Internet as a Speech Machine and 
Other Myths Confounding Section 230 Speech Reform 2 (Bos. Univ. Sch. of Law, Pub. 
Law Research Paper No. 20-8, 2020); see also Brown, supra note 45 (expounding several 
political attacks on CDA Section 230 by both Republican and Democratic politicians); 
Goldman, Dear President Biden, supra note 69, at 2 (“In general, the Democrats want 
Internet services to remove more content; the Republicans want Internet services to remove 
less content.”). 
80 Citron & Franks, supra note 79, at 15–16. 
81 Supra notes 25–26 and accompanying text. 
82 E.g., Klonick, supra note 21, at 1669–70 (“[Social media platforms] are private self-
regulating entities that are economically and normatively motivated to reflect the 
democratic culture and free speech expectations of their users. But these incentives might 
no longer be enough.”). 
83 E.g., Arthur Chu, Mr. Obama, Tear Down This Liability Shield, TECHCRUNCH (Sept. 
29, 2015), https://techcrunch.com/2015/09/29/mr-obama-tear-down-this-liability-shield/ 
[https://perma.cc/UJ2F-XJUK]; Citron & Wittes, supra note 47, at 404, 413 (advocating a 
reform, not abolition); Heather Saint, Note, Section 230 of the Communications Decency 
Act: The True Culprit of Internet Defamation, 36 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 39, 65–67 (2015). 
84 Tushnet, supra note 47, at 1009 (“I am arguing that if we limit intermediary 
responsibility…we should also limit intermediary power to control speech. There is no 
reason that any speech rights that Internet intermediaries possess should be vested in 
intermediaries’ management, rather than attributed to users only when those users 
misbehave.”). 
85 E.g., id. at 1012; Grimmelmann, supra note 37, at 106–08 (referring to copyright law 
and distinguishing between automated and human moderation, proposing to apply blanket 
immunity only to the former so that “content-specific human curation could be treated as 
distributors (liable after notice)”); Mark A. Lemley, Rationalizing Internet Safe Harbors, 
6 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 101, 115–18 (2007) (arguing in favor of a 
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II. THE PATH TO REGULATING SOCIAL MEDIA IN GERMANY: POLITICAL AND 
LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The appropriate approach in Germany is also being evaluated, 
albeit against a different backdrop. This Part will discuss the path 
that led to this discussion, illuminating this different background. 
A. Political Background: Polarization, Slander, and Solution 
Approaches 
Parallel to the ever-increasing spread of social networks, the po-
litical discourse in Germany also changed. While the two largest 
German political parties formed a governing coalition over a long 
time during the last two decades, diminishing their traditional ri-
valry, gaps in the political spectrum were filled by others; polariza-
tion is no longer between those two parties, but outside them.86 The 
political discourse was shaken by the refugee crisis in 2015, when 
many refugees fled to Europe.87 German Chancellor Angela Mer-
kel’s decision to allow about one million refugees to enter Germany 
for humanitarian reasons was initially met with much approval, but 
then provoked increasing criticism.88 There would be many xeno-
phobic voices89 that expressed offensive criticism not only in the 
pub or in their social circles, but also on social networks. These peo-
ple were hostile to foreigners and German politicians, who, in their 
opinion, let too many foreigners enter the country.90 Even though 
there has always been hate speech on social networks, this was a 
breeding ground for the problem to get out of hand. So far, the court 
 
standardization following the model of trademark law, namely section 32(2) of the Lanham 
Act); Benjamin Volpe, From Innovation to Abuse: Does The Internet Still Need Section 
230 Immunity?, 68 CATH. U. L. REV. 597, 620–22 (2019) (advocating for a provision 
similar to copyright law). 
86 See Sara Miller Llana, Grand Coalition? Why Some in Germany Prefer Polarization 
to a Mushy Middle, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Feb. 26, 2018), https://www.csmonitor.com/ 
World/Europe/2018/0226/Grand-coalition-Why-some-in-Germany-prefer-polarization-to 
-a-mushy-middle [https://perma.cc/G6BU-P7J8]. 
87 Neudert, supra note 17, at 155. 
88 See Manuela Bojadžijev, Migration as Social Seismograph: An Analysis of 
Germany’s ‘Refugee Crisis’ Controversy, 31 INT’L J. POL., CULTURE, & SOC’Y 335, 339–
41 (2018). 
89 Neudert, supra note 17, at 155. 
90 See DAVID KAYE, Wir schaffen das!, in SPEECH POLICE: THE GLOBAL STRUGGLE TO 
GOVERN THE INTERNET (Columbia Global Reports, 2019). 
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decisions handed down on the deletion of posts on social networks 
are also characterized by xenophobia.91 According to German police 
surveys, xenophobic, racist, and anti-Semitic crimes still accounted 
for most hate crimes in 2018 and 2019.92 
Already facing that issue in September 2015, the Federal Minis-
try of Justice93 set up a committee of Internet service providers, civil 
society organizations, and media control institutions to solve the 
problem on a voluntary basis.94 But, in the opinion of the govern-
ment, this approach did not provide for the necessary relief.95 The 
NetzDG’s draft was largely based on the fact that hate crime and 
other punishable content poses a major threat to the peaceful coex-
istence of a free, open, and democratic society when it cannot be 
effectively fought and prosecuted.96 The referendum in the UK on 
remaining in or leaving the EU in June 2016 and the US presidential 
election in November 2016 highlighted the problem of spreading 
false news on the Internet.97  
A study commissioned by the government, based on research 
carried out in January and February 2017, found that there was in-
sufficient removal of reported posts on social networks.98 It con-
cluded that, “compared to the last test, YouTube greatly improved 
the deletion rate for reported criminal content (from 10% to 90%), 
 
91 See infra Section I.A. 
92 Gesetzentwurf der Fraktionen der CDU/CSU und SPD [Governing Caucuses’ Draft] 
DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG: DRUCKSACHEN[BT]19/17741, 19, http://dip21.bundestag.de/ 
dip21/btd/19/177/1917741.pdf [https://perma.cc/J2VQ-PBBC] (Ger.). 
93 The full name of the agency is the Federal Ministry of Justice and Consumer 
Protection, or Bundesministerium der Justiz und für Verbraucherschutz [BMJV]. 
94 Federal Ministry of Justice, Gemeinsam gegen Hassbotschaften [Together Against 
Messages of Hate], Dec. 15, 2015, https://www.bmjv.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/ 
News/Artikel/12152015_TaskForceErgebnispapier.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=2 
[https://perma.cc/FR8B-SHPR]. 
95 Gesetzentwurf der Fraktionen der CDU/CSU und SPD [Governing Caucuses’ Draft] 
DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG: DRUCKSACHEN[BT]18/12356, 1, http://dipbt.bundestag.de/ 
dip21/btd/18/123/1812356.pdf [https://perma.cc/7J86-Q3YX]. 
96 Id. 
97 See id. 
98 See id at 1–2. 
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Facebook deleted less (from 46% to 39%), and Twitter continued to 
react poorly to user messages (only 1%).”99 
B. Legislative Procedure and Political Debate 
The Federal Ministry of Justice reacted to the 2017 study with a 
draft law in the same year.100 After the federal government101 passed 
this draft, it went through the usual legislative procedure. The Bun-
desrat102 essentially welcomed the proposal, but had numerous pro-
posed amendments, which are not particularly relevant for this Ar-
ticle.103 At the subsequent hearing before the responsible committee 
in the Bundestag, the German federal parliament, considerable 
doubts were raised by some experts.104 Among other aspects, the 
risk of over-blocking and the possible violation of fundamental 
 
99 Löschung rechtswidriger Hassbeiträg bei Facebook, YouTube und Twitter: 
Ergebenisse des Monitorings von Beschwerdemechanismen jugendaffiner Dienste 
[Deletion of Illegal Hate Posts on Facebook, YouTube and Twitter: Results of the 




100 For the first version of the draft, see Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung Entwurf 
eines Gesetzes zur Verbesserung der Rechtsdurchsetzung in sozialen Netzwerken 
(Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz NetzDG) [Bill of the Federal Government Draft Law to 




101 Bundesregierung. The federal government is at the head of the executive branch but 
plays an important role in the legislative process, with most laws being drafted in the 
ministries due to their greater competence and staffing. 
102 The Bundesrat (Federal Council) is, besides the Bundestag (Federal Parliament), the 
second legislative body. It represents the sixteen states of Germany (Länder) at the federal 
level and is––with varying degrees of power––involved in the enactment of all federal 
laws. 
103 The Bundesrat was successful, for example, in including STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB] 
[PENAL CODE], § 201a in the catalogue of NETZDG § 1, para. 3 and enshrining responses 
to complaints in NETZDG § 3, para. 2 no. 3a. See Regierungsentwurf [Cabinet Draft], 
DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG: DRUCKSACHEN[BT]18/12727, 19–20, http://dipbt.bundestag.de/ 
dip21/btd/18/127/1812727.pdf [https://perma.cc/W2XM-NEDA]. 
104 For a summary of most experts’ opinions, see Geplante Änderung des 
Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetzes in der Kritik [Planned Change of the Network 
Enforcement Law in the Criticism], DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG, https://www.bunde 
stag.de/dokumente/textarchiv/2020/kw25-pa-recht-netzwerkdurchsetzung-699188 
[https://perma.cc/7NPU-B6LJ]. 
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rights were stressed.105 Subsequently, the bill was amended in the 
parliament,106 but in essence left untouched. 
The proposed law triggered a major debate. One newspaper, for 
instance, claimed that the Belarusian autocrat Lukashenko was in-
voking the German law for his oppressive measures.107 Moreover, it 
is assumed that “countries with less noble goals [than Germany] 
have taken inspiration from NetzDG.”108 In the early days of 
NetzDG, Twitter temporarily mistakenly suspended, based on its 
own standards, the account of a German satirical magazine for 
mocking a far-right politician’s post on Muslims.109 It was grist for 
the NetzDG critics’ mill, as it did seem to prove that platforms may 
misjudge even obviously legal posts.110 Yet, the act does not provide 
the sanction of account suspension. It is, therefore, doubtful whether 
there is a reasonable connection to the NetzDG.111 
 
105 E.g., Reporter Ohn Grenzen Für Informationsfreiheit [Reporters Without Borders for 
Freedom of Information], Stellungnahme zum Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Verbesserung 
der Rechtsdurchsetzung in sozialen Netzwerken der Fraktionen von CDU/CSU und SPD 
(BT DS 18/12356) [Opinion on Draft Law on Enhance Law Enforcement in Social 
Networks of the CDU/CSU and SPD Parliamentary Groups (BT DS 18/12356)], 
https://www.bundestag.de/resource/blob/510780/aee6b7be1689e54c1740d78210db5d44/
mihr_rog-data.pdf [https://perma.cc/NR4E-8XN8]. This Article addresses over-blocking 
infra Section V.C. and fundamental rights infra Section II.C.2.  
106 See Beschlussempfehlung des Rechtsausschusses [Resolution Recommendation of 
the Legal Committee], DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG: DRUCKSACHEN[BT]18/13013, 5–13, 
https://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/18/130/1813013.pdf [https://perma.cc/G2TB-
HU5U]. 
107 Martin Ferber, Facebook-Gesetz: Schießt Maas übers Ziel hinaus?, AUSBURGER 
ALLGEMEINE (June 20, 2017), https://www.augsburger-allgemeine.de/politik/Facebook-
Gesetz-Schiesst-Maas-uebers-Ziel-hinaus-id41792751.html [https://perma.cc/ZM3K-
9ZRF]. 
108 Zipursky, supra note 9, at 1361 (“Russia, Singapore, and the Philippines have all cited 
NetzDG in pending legislation that will limit speech online….NetzDG has become the 
impetus not only for troubling censorship in Germany itself, but also for global censorship 
around the world.”). 
109 David Martin, German Satire Magazine Titanic Back on Twitter Following ‘Hate 
Speech’ Ban, DUEUTSCHE WELLE (Jan. 6, 2018), https://www.dw.com/en/german-satire-
magazine-titanic-back-on-twitter-following-hate-speech-ban/a-42046485 
[https://perma.cc/QZ24-ZZLQ]. 
110 See id.; Andrea Diener, Storch-Satire ist nicht regelkonform, FRANKFURTER 
ALLGEMEINE (Jan. 3, 2018), https://www.faz.net/aktuell/feuilleton/medien/twitter-sperrt-
titanic-magazin-wegen-storch-satire-15371919.html [https://perma.cc/3JCM-J9RY]. 
111 Sandra Schmitz-Berndt & Christian M. Berndt, The German Act on Improving Law 
Enforcement on Social Networks: A Blunt Sword? 30–31 (Working Paper, Dec. 14, 2018). 
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Meanwhile, the federal government approved two drafts to 
amend the NetzDG.112 These proposals are intended to enhance 
NetzDG’s regulatory approach. While the first one was signed into 
law on March 30, 2021, it remains uncertain whether the second one 
will come into force and, if so, when.113 
C.  Legal Background 
This Article cannot expound all pertinent aspects of the German 
legal framework. However, two pivotal subject areas—the right of 
personality and fundamental rights—are addressed below. 
1. Right of Personality 
The NetzDG was enacted to ensure that claims arising from vi-
olations of personal rights were enforced. The right of personality is 
not expressly regulated anywhere, but is protected by general prin-
ciples of tort law and is violated, among other subsets, by insults and 
disparagement.114 It protects the autonomous area of private life, in 
which everyone can develop and maintain their individuality, so that 
everyone can, for example, decide for themselves whether and to 
what extent their life events get publicly presented.115 Violation of 
the right to personality leads to a claim for injunctive relief.116 This 
holds unquestionably true for a user who posts infringing content on 
a social network’s platform. On the other hand, because it is the host 
provider, the platform is not responsible for its user’s content.117 
 
112 See discussion infra Sections III.B.3–4. 
113 Id. 
114 See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], Feb. 26, 
2015, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 2022 (2015); Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] 
[Federal Court of Justice], Mar. 15, 1989, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 3028 
(1989). For more on the German Right of Personality, see Ryan Kraski, Combating Fake 
News in Social Media: U.S. and German Legal Approaches, 91 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 923, 
930–35 (2017). 
115 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] June 5, 1973, 35 
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 202, 220 (1974). 
116 E.g., Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Higher Regional Court] Nürnberg Nov. 13, 2018, 
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR URHEBER- UND MEDIENRECHT [ZUM] 190, 191 (2018). 
117 Telemediengesetz [TMG] [Teleservices Act], Feb. 26, 2007, BUNDESGESETZBLATT, 
Tiel I [BGBL. I] at 251, § 10, sentence 1. This provision is based on article 14 of the E-
Commerce Directive. See Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
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This protection is afforded to the platforms provided that it has no 
knowledge of the illegal content and it acts immediately to remove 
or block access as soon as it becomes aware.118 Nonetheless, this 
implies that the platform must act upon notice in order to avoid lia-
bility. On top of that, the Federal Court of Justice,119 the highest 
German civil court, held in 2011 regarding an allegation of fact in a 
blog post: 
The host provider is only obliged to take action if the 
reported information is so specific that the infringe-
ment can be easily affirmed on the basis of the alle-
gations of the reporting person, i.e. without a thor-
ough legal and factual examination…. As a rule, the 
complaint of the reporting person must first be for-
warded to the [posting user] for comment. If a state-
ment is not made within a reasonable period of time, 
the report shall be assumed to be justified and the re-
ported post shall be deleted. If the [user] refutes the 
complaint in a substantiated manner and if justified 
doubts arise, the provider is, in general, obliged to 
inform the reporting party and, if necessary, to de-
mand evidence of the alleged infringement. If the re-
porting party fails to respond or fails to provide any 
evidence that may be required, no further investiga-
tion will be initiated. If the reporting person’s re-
sponse or the submitted evidence show an illegal vi-
olation of the right of personality, even taking into 
account [the posting user’s] statement, the content in 
question is to be deleted.120 
 
Council of 8 June 2000 on Certain Legal Aspects of Information Society Services, in 
Particular Electronic Commerce, in the Internal Market, art. 14, 2000 O.J. (L 178) 13 
[hereinafter E-Commerce Directive]. 
118 Telemediengesetz [TMG] [Teleservices Act] § 10. 
119 Bundesgerichtshof (BGH). 
120 Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Oct. 25, 2011, NEUE JURISTISCHE 
WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 148, 150–51 (2012); aff’d by Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal 
Court of Justice] Feb. 27, 2018, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 2324, 2327 
(2018). 
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After all, if a violation of personal rights is committed by a user 
on an Internet platform, the platform may not be directly responsible 
for the violation.121 Nevertheless, it was already subject to certain 
obligations prior to NetzDG.122 
2. Fundamental Rights Involved 
As in the United States, the legality of a German law is judged 
by its constitution—the Grundgesetz.123 Various fundamental rights 
granted by it are discussed in relation to the NetzDG. The debate 
focuses on the Freedom of Expression and Information:124 “For  
a free and democratic state order it is absolutely constitutive.”125  
Numerous scholars are of the view that NetzDG violates the Free-
dom of Expression and Information and is, therefore, unconstitu-
tional.126 Arguably, this is based on the concern that under the 
NetzDG the platforms would, in case of doubt, tend to delete content 
and, thus, prevent legal expressions of opinion.127 The UN Special 
Rapporteur David Kaye had severe concerns for the integrity of both 
 
121 See id. at 150 (holding that the platform neither wrote the blog post nor adopted its 
content as its own). 
122 Schmitz-Berndt & Berndt, supra note 111, at 11. 
123 Grundgesetz [GG] [Basic Law], translation available at https://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/englisch_gg/ [https://perma.cc/SDG9-FCGM]. 
124 Id. at Art. 5, para. 1. 
125 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Jan. 15, 1958, 7 
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 198, 208 (1958). 
However, false factual claims are not protected. See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] 
[Federal Constitutional Court] June 3, 1980, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 
2072, 2073 (1980). Also, the right of personality generally prevails in cases of insults and 
vilification, i.e., when the defamation of the person is the main focus. 
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Feb. 8, 2017, NEUE 
JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 1460, 1460–61 (2017). 
126 E.g., Nikolaus Guggenberger, Das Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz—schön gedacht, 
schlecht gemacht, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR RECHTSPOLITIK [ZRP] 98, 100 (2017); Marc Liesching, 
Die Durchsetzung von Verfassungs- und Europarecht gegen das NetzDG. Überblick über 
die wesentlichen Kritikpunkte, 21 MULTIMEDIA UND RECHT [MMR] 26, 27–28 (2018); 
Fiete Kalscheuer & Christian Hornung, Das Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz—Ein 
verfassungswidriger Schnellschuss, NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR VERWALTUNGSRECHT [NVwZ] 
1721, 1724 (2017). 
127 See Gerald Spindler, Rechtsdurchsetzung von Persönlichkeitsrechten. Bußgelder 
gegen Provider als Enforcement?, GEWERBLICHER RECHTSSCHUTZ UND URHEBERRECHT 
[GRUR] 365, 366 (2018); infra Section V.C. 
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the right to freedom of expression and the right to privacy.128 Such 
violations have yet to be found by a court. In fact, a lawsuit brought 
by two politicians based on Freedom of Expression already failed 
for procedural reasons.129 
Since certain obligations are imposed on platforms, their occu-
pational freedom is also affected.130 Although Facebook, in its state-
ment on the NetzDG draft in 2017, opined that the Act is unconsti-
tutional,131 all affected platforms have let the deadline for a consti-
tutional complaint to the Federal Constitutional Court132 expire.133 
 
III. THE APPROACH OF EXTERNAL REGULATION: NETZDG 
A. NetzDG’s Scope 
NetzDG applies to social networks with at least two million us-
ers located in Germany.134 Moreover, platforms’ complaint proce-
dure must only be carried out in case of particularly unlawful con-
tent.135 Hence, the Act’s scope is narrower than some might think. 
 
128 Kaye, supra note 18, at 4. 
129 Verwaltungsgericht Köln [VG] [Administrative Trial Court] Feb. 14, 2019, 
MULTIMEDIA UND RECHT [MMR] 342, 342 (2019). 
130 Grundgesetz [GG] [Basic Law], Art. 12, para. 1; see also Gesetzentwurf der 
Fraktionen der CDU/CSU und SPD [Governing Caucuses’ Draft] DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG: 
DRUCKSACHEN[BT]18/12356, 21. 
131 Stellungnahme zum Entwurf des Netswerkdurchsetzungsgestzes [Opinion on the Draft 




132 The Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfG) is the only German court that can void a 
federal law. 
133 Lena Isabell Löber & Alexander Roßnagel, Das Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz in der 
Umsetzung. Bilanz nach den ersten Transparenzberichten, 22 MULTIMEDIA UND RECHT 
[MMR] 71, 71 (2019). A constitutional complaint that challenges a law must be lodged 
within one year of the law entering into force. See Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz 
[BVERFGG] [Act on the Federal Constitutional Court], Aug. 11, 1993, 
BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil I [BGBL. I] at 1473, § 93, para. 3, translation available at 
https://www.gesetze-im-Internet.de/englisch_bverfgg/englisch_bverfgg.html#p0408 
[https://perma.cc/FCH6-4PPZ].  
134 NetzDG § 1, para. 1, sentence 1, para. 2. 
135 Id. § 1, para. 3, § 3, para. 1 and 2. 
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1. Social Network 
Social networks are defined as “telemedia service providers 
which, for profit-making purposes, operate Internet platforms which 
are designed to enable users to share any content with other users or 
to make such content available to the public.”136 Neither platforms 
offering journalistic or editorial content nor platforms which are de-
signed to enable individual communication, such as email ser-
vices,137 or the dissemination of specific content, such as business 
and employment-oriented platforms,138 are considered social net-
works within the meaning of NetzDG.139 This also holds true for 
online games and sales platforms.140 
Obligations under the NetzDG only arise when the number of 
registered users in Germany equals or exceeds two million.141 This 
criterion was criticized as being too imprecise, because it remains 
vague which users exactly fall under that definition, given that they 
might disguise their location through a VPN.142 Moreover, no period 
of time is indicated within which this criterion must be fulfilled.143 
However, YouTube, Twitter, and Facebook clearly meet the re-
quirement.144 
 
136 Id. § 1, para. 1, sentence 1. 
137 Gesetzentwurf der Fraktionen der CDU/CSU und SPD [Governing Caucuses’ Draft] 
DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG: DRUCKSACHEN[BT]18/12356, 18. 
138 Id. at 19. 
139 NetzDG § 1, para. 1, sentence 1. 
140 Beschlussempfehlung des Rechtsausschusses [Resolution Recommendation of the 
Legal Committee], DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG: DRUCKSACHEN[BT]18/13013, 18. 
141 NetzDG § 1, para. 2. 
142 Marc Liesching, § 1 NetzDG Scope of Application, in STRAFRECHTLICHE 
NEBENGESETZE (Georg Erbs & Max Kohlhaas, 218th supplement 2018). 
143 Gerald Spindler, Das Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz, 9 KOMMUNIKATION & RECHT 
[K&R] 533, 534 (2017). 
144 Furthermore, other platforms, such as TikTok, fall within NetzDG’s scope. See 
TIKTOK, TIKTOK TRANSPARENCY REPORT (Feb. 24, 2021), available at 
https://perma.cc/NNE4-QCTY. This Article, however, focuses on the three surely most 
important and famous social networks: YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter. 
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2. Unlawful Content 
The obligations of social networks under the NetzDG with re-
spect to a certain complaint procedure only refer to unlawful con-
tent.145 This includes the content being indictable pursuant to partic-
ular listed statutes in the German Penal Code, e.g., use of symbols 
of unconstitutional organizations,146 forming terrorist organizations, 
incitement of masses (sedition),147 including denial of the Holo-
caust,148 child pornography, insult, malicious gossip, defamation, 
violation of intimate privacy by taking photographs or other images, 
and threatening commission of serious criminal offense.149 For ex-
ample, the link in a post to the article “Merkel Regime Wants to Ex-
propriate Land from Citizens in Order to Build Houses for Illegals” 
was unlawful.150 It was illegal because the article incited masses, 
where refugees and asylum seekers were described as “sex and vio-
lence tourists” and as “African drug dealers or rapists” and it was 
claimed that “no normal person wants to have illegal asylum seekers 
as direct neighbors.”151 
 
145 NetzDG § 3, para. 1. 
146 An example of a symbol of an unconstitutional organization is the Nazi swastika. 
Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Higher Regional Court] Frankfurt, Mar. 18, 1998, NEUE 
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR STRAFRECHT [NStZ] 356 (1999). 
147 This may include slurs that go beyond mere expressions of rejection and contempt 
that incite a hostile attitude, such that these expressions constitute the incitement of hatred. 
An example is insulting someone as a “cheeky Jew functionary”, because the term “cheeky 
Jew” (“frecher Jude”) is part of the characteristic vocabulary of the Nazi language. 
Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Higher Regional Court] Hamm, Jan. 28, 2020, 3 RVs 1/20, 
aff’d, Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], July 7, 2020, 
NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 297 (2021). 
148 Holocaust denial is indictable under STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB] [PENAL CODE], 
§ 130, para. 3, translation available at https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stgb/ 
englisch_stgb.pdf [https://perma.cc/9GDN-WMF4] (“Whoever publicly or in a meeting 
approves of, denies or downplays an act committed under the rule of National Socialism 
of the kind indicated in section 6(1) of the Code of Crimes against International Law in a 
manner which is suitable for causing a disturbance of the public peace incurs a penalty of 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years or a fine.”). 
149 NetzDG § 1, para. 3 (referring to, among other sections, STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB] 
[PENAL CODE], §§ 86a, 129a, 130, 184b, 185, 185, 187, 201, and 241). For more on the 
German Speech-Related Criminal Codes, see Kraski, supra note 114, at 938–40. 
150 Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Higher Regional Court] München, Sept. 17, 2018, NEUE 
JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 3119, 3121–22 (2018). 
151 Id. 
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However, it is important to point out that not everything one 
might call hate speech or fake news falls within the scope of the 
NetzDG. One of the listed offenses must necessarily be present.152 
Hence, particularly in the fight against fake news, it was clear from 
the outset that the NetzDG can only make a limited contribution.153 
A mere false assertion of a fact is not punishable per se but is only 
indictable under very specific circumstances. 
Furthermore, it is important to emphasize (and is often ne-
glected) that the removal and blocking obligations for platforms, as 
explained above, already result from general legal principles154 and 
that the NetzDG is only intended to regulate practical enforcement 
(i.e., the procedure).155 This is expressly provided for in the legisla-
tion materials.156 Thus, the NetzDG does not “introduce a new lia-
bility regime nor does it render previously legal speech illegal. It 
rather sets up a compliance regime [for] complaints manage-
ments.”157 Besides, this is reflected by the Act’s title, Network En-
forcement Act. 
Consequently, in criminal offenses without the involvement of 
personal rights interests (e.g., use of symbols of unconstitutional or-
ganizations), there is no claim for removal or blocking. But in the 
event of failure to delete the illegal content, potential regulatory con-
sequences through fines may follow.158 
B. Procedure for Handling Complaints 
In handing complaints, platforms first check for a violation of 
their own guidelines.159 If they find any infringement, they delete 
 
152 NetzDG § 1, para. 3. 
153 Löber & Roßnagel, supra note 133, at 74. 
154 Supra Section II.C.1. 
155 Alexander Schiff, Meinungsfreiheit in mediatisierten digitalen Räumen. Das NetzDG 
auf dem Prüfstand des Verfassungsrechts, 21 MULIMEDIA UND RECHT [MMR] 366, 367 
(2018). 
156 Gesetzentwurf der Fraktionen der CDU/CSU und SPD [Governing Caucuses’ Draft] 
DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG: DRUCKSACHEN[BT]18/12356, 22. 
157 Schmitz-Berndt & Berndt, supra note 111, at 16. 
158 NetzDG § 4. 
159 For those guidelines, see infra Part IV. 
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the content across all countries; if not, they check for blocking on 
the basis of the NetzDG, which then only takes place in Germany.160 
1. Statutory Standards 
NetzDG regulates proceedings to remove or block certain un-
lawful posts. Removal means that the content is deleted worldwide, 
whereas blocked content is unavailable only for users with a German 
IP address.161 
Social networks must “maintain an effective and transparent 
procedure for handling complaints about unlawful content” and  
provide “users with an easily recognizable, directly accessible and  
permanently available procedure for submitting complaints.”162 The 
procedure must ensure that complaints are immediately addressed 
and checks are carried out.163 The report must be noted by someone 
who is authorized to delete and block content.164 Management must 
monitor the processing of complaints and offer training courses to 
the concerned employees.165 Both the complainant and the user who 
posted the content must be notified about any decision rendered.166 
Every registered user may avail themselves of this complaint proce-
dure. However, people outside the social network cannot, even if 
they are affected by illegal content—they can only rely on their tort-
based claim.167 As a result, one needs to create an account in order 
to benefit from the complaint procedure, which seems odd. 
 
160 E.g., Removals Under the Network Enforcement Law, GOOGLE, https://transparency 
report.google.com/netzdg/youtube?hl=en [https://perma.cc/6RY7-6F4Y] (“If the content 
violates our YouTube Community Guidelines we remove it globally. If the content does 
not fall under these policies, but we identify it as illegal according to one of the 21 statutes 
of the StGB to which NetzDG refers (§ 1 III NetzDG) or any other local law, we locally 
restrict it.”). 
161 Schmitz-Berndt & Berndt, supra note 111, at 18. Thus, the social network platforms 
opt for “blocking” if content does not infringe their self-imposed guidelines, but does 
infringe Section 1, paragraph 3 of the NetzDG. 
162 NetzDG § 3, para. 1. 
163 Id. § 3, para. 2, no. 1. 
164 Gesetzentwurf der Fraktionen der CDU/CSU und SPD [Governing Caucuses’ Draft] 
DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG: DRUCKSACHEN[BT]18/12356, 22. 
165 NetzDG § 3, para. 4. 
166 Id. § 3, para. 2, no. 5. 
167 Nikolaus Guggenberger, Das Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz in der Anwendung, 36 
NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 2577, 2581 (2017). 
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Regardless, manifestly unlawful content must get removed or 
blocked within twenty-four hours of receiving the complaint.168  
According to NetzDG’s legislative materials, a post is manifestly 
unlawful “if an in-depth examination is not necessary to find the un-
lawfulness.”169 This arguably applies, for instance, to insults using 
swear words. On the other hand, it is not manifestly unlawful if 
doubts remain in fact or in law.170 The social network, however, can 
also reach an agreement with the competent law enforcement au-
thority to extend the period of time in which they must delete or 
block any manifestly unlawful content.171 
Content that is not manifestly unlawful must be banned imme-
diately—unverzüglich—and generally within seven days of receiv-
ing the complaint.172 It is worth mentioning here that unverzüglich 
is an established term in German civil law and defined by the Civil 
Code as “without culpable delay”—“ohne schuldhaftes Zögern.”173 
Depending on the specific circumstances, a period greater than 
seven days may be deemed appropriate.174 If the content refers to 
factual circumstances, the social network can give the user an op-
portunity to respond to the complaint and exceed the seven-day time 
limit.175 If the opportunity for the user to respond remains unused, 
the social network may assume that the complaint is correct and re-
move the content; if, on the other hand, the user defends themself, 
the network must weigh up the credibility of conflicting claims.176 
 
168 NetzDG § 3, para. 2, no. 2. 
169 Gesetzentwurf der Fraktionen der CDU/CSU und SPD [Governing Caucuses’ Draft] 
DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG: DRUCKSACHEN[BT]18/12356, 22. 
170 Beschlussempfehlung des Rechtsausschusses [Resolution Recommendation of the 
Legal Committee], DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG: DRUCKSACHEN[BT]18/13013, 20. 
171 NetzDG § 3, para. 2, no. 2. 
172 Id. § 3, para. 2, no. 3. 
173 BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], § 121, para. 1, sentence 1, 
translation available at https://perma.cc/2Z25-2F2K. The above-mentioned English 
language version of the NetzDG (supra note 7) is unfortunately somewhat imprecise in this 
respect, as it does not correspond terminologically to the English translation of the BGB 
published by the Federal Ministry of Justice.  
174 NetzDG § 3, para. 2, no. 3; see also Beschlussempfehlung des Rechtsausschusses 
[Resolution Recommendation of the Legal Committee], DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG: 
DRUCKSACHEN[BT]18/13013, 20. 
175 NetzDG § 3, para. 2, no. 3a. 
176 Beschlussempfehlung des Rechtsausschusses [Resolution Recommendation of the 
Legal Committee], DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG: DRUCKSACHEN[BT]18/13013, 21. 
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2. Data on Previous Bans 
In addition to the above, social networks must provide the public 
with other information, including complaints received, removals, 
and bans imposed.177 So far, social networks have published five 
transparency reports for the two halves of 2018 and 2019, respec-
tively, and the first half of 2020.178 YouTube also published its  
report for the second half of 2020.179 
In those years, YouTube counted 1,757,303 reported items.180 
Of these items, it removed 420,307,181 which results in 23.92% of 
items being removed, most of them “defamation or insults” or “hate 
speech or political extremism.”182 In the second half of 2020, 
YouTube processed 64,774 of 73,477complaints within twenty-four 
hours, or 88.15%.183 During this period, only 1,865 posts were 
blocked on basis of NetzDG, whereas 71,612 were blocked on the 
basis of YouTube’s Community Guidelines,184 resulting in 
NetzDG’s share of not more than 2.6%. The NetzDG complaints 
Facebook received in 2018, 2019, and the first half of 2020 con-
cerned just 14,114 items,185 4,431 of which were deleted186—a rate 
of 31.39%. Here, too, most of the blockings were carried out within 
twenty-four hours.187 Facebook, as opposed to YouTube, does not 
publish its data on complaints and removals in their NetzDG reports 
 
177 NetzDG § 2. 
178 This Article focuses on the three most important social networks: YouTube, 
Facebook, and Twitter. Other platforms fall within NetzDG’s scope as well. Supra note 
144. 






185 FACEBOOK, NETZDG TRANSPARENCY REPORT § 3 (July 2018–July 2020) 
https://www.facebook.com/help/285230728652028 [https://perma.cc/C9KU-3SVT]. The 
number of complaints on Facebook is probably much lower because a report based on the 
NetzDG cannot be made directly at the post, where, by contrast, a report based on the 
Community Standards could be made. Schmitz-Berndt & Berndt, supra note 111, at 36. 
After all, the fine imposed on Facebook in 2019 was also motivated by the fact that the 
reporting form was too hidden. See infra Section III.E. 
186 FACEBOOK, supra note 185, at § 7. 
187See id. at § 8. 
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but only on a worldwide basis, because of its Community Stand-
ards.188 This makes a comparison to NetzDG blocking very difficult. 
Twitter received 2,633,986 complaints189 with 357,985 of them be-
ing successful, or 13.59%.190 After all, in 2018 and 2019, a total of 
2,921,553 complaints were submitted to all social networks affected 
by the NetzDG, of which about 28% resulted in blockings.191 
3. Cooperation with Authorities 
On February 19, 2020, the German federal government ap-
proved a draft amendment to the NetzDG that primarily introduced 
an obligation for social media to report removed and blocked con-
tent to the Federal Criminal Police Office192 if some of the offenses 
listed in NetzDG, section 1, paragraph 3 have been committed.193 
These offenses include incitement of the masses, but does not in-
clude insult.194 In addition to the posted content, the report shall also 
include the user’s IP address if known.195 A fine may be imposed  
on social networks if the procedure for transmitting the reports is  
not set up.196 The Federal Criminal Police Office is expected to 
transmit the information to the locally competent authority for crim-
inal prosecution.197 
 
188 See FACEBOOK, COMMUNITY STANDARDS ENFORCEMENT REPORT, 
https://transparency.facebook.com/community-standards-enforcement [https://perma.cc/ 
H3GE-RXZJ]. 
189 See TWITTER, NETWORK ENFORCEMENT ACT REPORT, (Jan. 2018-June 2020) 
https://transparency.twitter.com/de/countries/de.html [https://perma.cc/9E63-LCXX]. 
190  See id. 
191 See DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG: DRUCKSACHEN [BT] 19/17741, supra note 92, at 14. 
192 See Frank Jordans, Germany: Bill Requires Sites to Report Hate Speech to Police, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Feb. 19, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/ef38dbeb3c0d026e65f 
5dde6edeb3837 [https://perma.cc/PG2L-FB74]. 
193 See Gesetzentwurf der Fraktionen der CDU/CSU und SPD [Governing Caucuses’ 
Draft] DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG: DRUCKSACHEN[BT]19/17741, 13–14. This obligation will 
be enshrined in the future NetzDG § 3a. 
194 Id. at 15. These offences will be enumerated by the future NetzDG § 3a, para. 2, no. 3. 
195 Id. at 14. This will be stated by the future NetzDG § 3a, para. 4, no. 2. 
196 Id.16. This will be stated by the future NetzDG § 4, para. 1, no. 6a. 
197 Id. at 15. 
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Some had already postulated that kind of cooperation between 
social media platform and criminal authorities before.198 On March 
10, 2020, the two governing parties introduced the draft into parlia-
ment,199 where it was passed on June 18, 2020 without amendments 
to the NetzDG.200  After the draft had been updated,201 the German 
head of state, the Bundespräsident, signed it into law on March 30, 
2021. Most of the amendments to the NetzDG will come into force 
on February 1, 2022.202 
4. Review Procedure? 
On April 27, 2020, the government followed this first proposal 
with another draft amendment.203 Similar to previous proposals, this 
draft includes an obligation for social networks to provide an easily 
recognizable procedure by which decisions on complaints can be re-
viewed.204 Both the user and the complainant can appeal under that 
procedure within fourteen days of the decision.205 The opposing 
party must be given the opportunity to respond, and names will not 
 
198 See Löber & Roßnagel, supra note 133, at 75; Jan Christian Sahl & Nils Bielzer, 
NetzDG 2.0—Ein Update für weniger Hass im Netz, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR RECHTSPOLITIK 
[ZRP] 2, 3 (2020). 
199 See Gesetzentwurf der Fraktionen der CDU/CSU und SPD [Governing Caucuses’ 
Draft] DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG: DRUCKSACHEN[BT]19/17741, 14. 
200 See Gesetz gegen Rechtsextremismus und Hasskriminalität beschlossen, DEUTSCHER 
BUNDESTAG: DRUCKSACHEN, https://www.bundestag.de/#url=L2Rva3VtZW50ZS90ZXh0 
YXJjaGl2LzIwMjAva3cyNS1kZS1yZWNodHNleHRyZW1pc211cy03MDExMDQ=&m
od=mod493054 [https://perma.cc/CUG3-5MHA]. 
201 See  Antwort der Bundesregierung auf eine Kleine Anfrage [Governmental Answer 
to an Inquiry], DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG: DRUCKSACHEN[BT]19/23867, 3, 
https://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/19/238/1923867.pdf [https://perma.cc/G4S9-FV46]. 
202 See Art. 10(2) Gesetz zur Bekämpfung des Rechtsextremismus und der 
Hasskriminalität [Law on Combating Right-Wing Extremism and Hate Crime], March 
30, 2021, BGBL at 441 (Ger.). 
203 Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung [Cabinet Draft], DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG: 
DRUCKSACHEN[BT]19/18792, 1, https://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/19/187/1918792 
.pdf [https://perma.cc/59QG-V9XD]. 
204 An evaluation commissioned by the Federal Ministry of Justice as well as Sahl & 
Bielzer had already called for this procedure. See EIFERT ET AL., 
NETZWERKDURCHSETZUNGSGESETZ IN DER BEWÄHRUNG 195 (1 Aufl. 2020); see also Sahl 
& Bielzer, supra note 198, at 4. 
205 See Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung [Cabinet Draft], DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG: 
DRUCKSACHEN[BT]19/18792, 9. 
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be disclosed.206 Thus, the government intends to explicitly enable a 
put-back claim, which several scholars had been calling for.207 Fur-
thermore, there exists the possibility that disputes be brought before 
private arbitration boards. The parliament has not discussed that pro-
posal yet. 
C. Self-Regulating Institution 
The seven-day time limit does not apply if the social network 
refers the decision to a recognized self-regulating institution within 
seven days of receiving the initial complaint.208 The social network 
fulfills its obligation by handing the complaints over to the institu-
tion.209 Facebook’s recently founded Oversight Board, to which Fa-
cebook and its users can refer cases for review and whose decisions 
are binding, is arguably an example of such an institution.210 
For the purpose of this alternative procedure, the relevant ad-
ministrative authority211 will recognize such an institution under cer-
tain conditions.212 In January 2020, for the first time, the Federal 
Office of Justice acknowledged a private organization as a self-reg-
ulating institution under the NetzDG.213 In order to determine if an 
institution fits this definition, it must be reviewed by a panel which 
 
206 Id. at 10. 
207 See Löber & Roßnagel, supra note 133, at 75; Alexander Peukert, Gewährleistung 
der Meinungs- und Informationsfreiheit in sozialen Netzwerken. Vorschlag für eine 
Ergänzung des NetzDG um sog. Put-back-Verfahren, 21 MULTIMEDIA UND RECHT [MMR] 
572, 572 (2018); Schiff, supra note 155, at 366. Contra Sandra Niggemann, Die NetzDG-
Novelle, COMPUTER UND RECHT [CR] 326, 330 (2020). So far, such a claim is accorded by 
the courts based on general principles, but not explicitly stipulated. See discussion infra 
Section IV.B. 
208 See NetzDG § 3. This does not apply, however, to manifestly unlawful content. See 
Beschlussempfehlung des Rechtsausschusses [Resolution Recommendation of the Legal 
Committee], DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG: DRUCKSACHEN[BT]18/13013, 21. 
209 See id. at 21. 
210 See Brent Harris, Establishing Structure and Governance for an Independent 
Oversight Board, FACEBOOK (Sept. 17, 2019), https://about.fb.com/news/2019/09/ 
oversight-board-structure/ [https://perma.cc/56US-2NDK]. 
211 See Press Release, Bundesamt für Justiz [BfJ] [Federal Office of Justice], Erstmals 
Selbstregulierung nach dem Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz (Jan. 23, 2020), available at 
https://www.bundesjustizamt.de/DE/Presse/Archiv/2020/20200123.html [https://perma. 
cc/3T76-8BBX]. 
212 See NetzDG § 3. 
213 See BfJ, supra note 211. 
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consists of fifty lawyers, forming committees of three members.214 
So far, Facebook and Google have joined that institution.215 
D. Reporting Obligation 
Many deplore the lack of transparency with respect to platforms’ 
handling of complaints.216 NetzDG aimed to address that issue: if a 
social network receives more than 100 complaints per calendar year, 
it must publish in the Federal Gazette—as well as on its website— 
half-yearly German-language reports on the handling of unlawful 
content complaints, expounding several enumerated issues.217 Plat-
forms’ biannual reports must include a description of the established 
proceedings, staffing numbers, the numbers of incoming com-
plaints, and executed removals or blockings.218 
E. Regulatory Fines 
The relevant administrative authority may impose a regulatory 
fine for actions or omissions including failure to produce a correct 
transparency report219 or failure to correctly provide a procedure for 
dealing with complaints under the NetzDG.220 The central concept 
of this regulation is that only systematic—or persistent221—viola-
tions by social networks can be sanctioned.222 Thus, a simple error 
in judging a post does not expose the social network to fines. Nor 
 
214 See NetzDG, FREIWILLIGE SELBSTKONTROLLE MULTIMEDIA-DIENSTEANBIETER [FSM] 
[ASSOCIATION FOR VOLUNTARY SELF-REGULATION OF DIGITAL MEDIA SERVICE 
PROVIDERS], https://www.fsm.de/en/netzdg#N1 [https://perma.cc/7P9W-RB45]. 
215 See WILLIAM ECHIKSON & OLIVIA KNODT, GERMANY’S NETZDG: A KEY TEST FOR 
COMBATTING ONLINE HATE 12 (Nov. 22, 2018). 
216 See e.g., Klonick, supra note 21, at 1665. 
217 See NetzDG § 2. 
218 See id. 
219 See NetzDG § 4. 
220 See id. 
221 See Beschlussempfehlung des Rechtsausschusses [Resolution Recommendation of 
the Legal Committee], DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG: DRUCKSACHEN[BT]18/13013, 22. 
222 See Spindler, supra note 127, at 365; Guggenberger, supra note 126, at 99; Echikson 
& Knodt, supra note 215, at 4; Schmitz-Berndt & Berndt, supra note 111, at 19; see also 
DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG: DRUCKSACHEN [BT] 18/12356, supra note 95, at 24–25; 
DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG: DRUCKSACHEN [BT] 18/12727, supra note 103, at 27; 
DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG: DRUCKSACHEN [BT] 19/18792, supra note 203, at 51. 
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does a misjudgment of a statement’s credibility to justify a com-
plaint or the response cause a fine.223 
The maximum fine is €50 million, approximately $55 million as 
of writing this Article.224 As stated, this is the maximum, not the 
rule. The exact fine is determined according to guidelines laid out 
by the relevant agency.225 These guidelines are general administra-
tive principles on the exercise of that authority’s discretion regard-
ing whether to impose a fine and how to calculate it.226 According 
to these guidelines, cases that are difficult to decide legally—e.g., 
sharp statements in political opinion campaigns—do not result in 
fines.227 The calculation of the fine is based on certain parameters, 
such as network’s registered number of users, economic circum-
stances, and whether the circumstances and consequences of the of-
fense are deemed light, medium, serious, very serious, or extremely 
serious.228 In July 2019, the authority imposed a fine on Facebook 
of €2 million based on its flawed transparency report for the first 
half of 2018 and the reporting form being “too hidden” for its  
users.229 
The federal government’s draft amendment to the NetzDG from 
April 2020 proposes that the supervisory administrative authority 
shall, in addition to its capacity to impose fines, be able to take other 
 
223 See Beschlussempfehlung des Rechtsausschusses [Resolution Recommendation of 
the Legal Committee], DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG: DRUCKSACHEN[BT]18/13013, 21. 
224 See NetzDG § 4; GESETZ ÜBER ORDNUNGSWIDRIGKEITEN [OWIG] [ACT ON 
REGULATORY OFFENSES], § 30, para. 2. 
225 See NetzDG § 4; Bundesamt für Justiz [BfJ] [Federal Office of Justice], Leitlinien 
Bußgelder [NetzDG Fine Guidelines], 1, available at https://www.bundesjustizamt.de/ 
DE/SharedDocs/Publikationen/NetzDG/Leitlinien_Geldbussen_de.pdf?__blob=publicati
onFile&v=6 [https://perma.cc/8VCF-K9D9].  
226 Id. at 2.  
227 See id.at 10. 
228 See id. at 13–14. 
229 See Press Release, Federal Office of Justice, Federal Office of Justice Issues Fine 
Against Facebook (July 3, 2019), available at https://www.bundesjustizamt.de/ 
DE/Presse/Archiv/2019/20190702_EN.html;jsessionid=CD4C0964D478984E72B7794B
5BF8EA81.1_cid394?nn=3451904 [https://perma.cc/D4UX-M9XE]. 
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“necessary measures” and oblige the platform to remedy the in-
fringement.230 This way, the authority can refrain from immediately 
charging fines, and can proceed with caution instead. 
 
IV. THE APPROACH OF INTERNAL REGULATION: SELF-IMPOSED STANDARDS 
Facebook’s Community Standards,231 YouTube’s Community 
Guidelines,232 and Twitter’s Rules and Policy233 contain self-im-
posed terms of prohibited content. Those may or may not overlap 
with NetzDG’s regulation of “unlawful content.” Facebook, for ex-
ample, restricts the display of female breasts if the nipples are visi-
ble.234 German law, in general, does not compel that. Moreover, 
self-imposed standards apply globally and provide the networks 
with more potential measures in case of a violation, most notably 
the blocking of an account or a read-only restriction, which does not 
exist in the NetzDG. Regardless, the NetzDG does not preclude 
more stringent regulations.235 
Those self-imposed standards provide both the networks as well 
as their user communities with advantages compared to external reg-
ulation. Self-framed rules will be easier to interpret and apply, which 
promotes uniform enforcement. They might also enjoy greater ac-
ceptance because users consent to them when creating an account. 
The existing self-imposed standards express a certain social and cor-
 
230 Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung [Cabinet Draft], DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG: 
DRUCKSACHEN[BT]19/18792, 13. 
231 Community Standards, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards/ 
[https://perma.cc/DBL5-H294]. 
232 YouTube’s Community Guidelines, YOUTUBE, https://creatoracademy.youtube.com 
/page/course/community-guidelines [https://perma.cc/9HAC-VNGB]. 
233 The Twitter Rules, TWITTER, https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-policies/twitter-
rules [https://perma.cc/8TTZ-U97G]. 
234 See 14. Adult Nudity and Sexual Activity, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/ 
communitystandards/adult_nudity_sexual_activity [https://perma.cc/S63C-R6QZ]. 
However, Facebook does allow images that depict protest actions or breastfeeding women, 
or photos of scarring after breast amputations. Id. 
235 Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Higher Regional Court] Dresden Aug. 8, 2018, NEUE 
JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 3111, 3113 (2018); Oberlandesgericht [OLG] 
[Higher Regional Court] Nürnberg Aug. 4, 2020, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR URHEBER- UND 
MEDIENRECHT RECHTSPRECHUNGSDIENST [ZUM-RD] 16, 24 (2021). 
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porate responsibility and, even more importantly, are based on eco-
nomic necessities.236 Platforms pursuing a sound business model 
simply cannot afford a hostile environment on their sites as it will 
deter many decent users.237 
A. External Regulation of Internal Regulation 
Under German law, the self-imposed standards are regarded as 
general terms and conditions (“Allgemeine Geschäftsbedingungen,” 
“AGB”) in the contractual relationship between user and platform.238 
Such AGB are subject to intense regulation by the German Civil 
Code and can be held void by courts in the event of a violation of 
the regulations.239 However, the courts have upheld No. 12 of Face-
 
236 Klonick, supra note 21, at 1615, 1617–18, 1625 (“[P]latforms have created a 
voluntary system of self-regulation because they are economically motivated to create a 
hospitable environment for their users in order to incentivize engagement. This self-
regulation involves both reflecting the norms of their users around speech as well as 
keeping up as much speech as possible. Online platforms also self-regulate for reasons of 
social and corporate responsibility, which in turn reflect free speech norms.”). 
237 Id. at 1627 (“Take down too much content and you lose not only the opportunity for 
interaction, but also the potential trust of users. Likewise, keeping up all content on a site 
risks making users uncomfortable and losing page views and revenue.”). Twitter is named 
an example in that regard. Id. at 1629 (“As Twitter’s user growth stagnated, many blamed 
the site’s inability to police harassment, hate speech, and trolling on its site for the slump.”). 
238 Facebook’s Terms of Service, for instance, explicitly refer to its Community 
Standards. Terms of Service, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/legal/terms 
[https://perma.cc/E8DX-REMX]. Yet, German courts usually do not draw a distinction in 
that regard, and deem the self-imposed rules as terms and conditions, no matter where they 
are laid down. E.g., Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Higher Regional Court] München, Jan. 7, 
2020, MULTIMEDIA UND RECHT [MMR] 79 , 81 (2021) (referring to No. 5 of Facebook’s 
Terms of Service); Landgericht [LG] [Regional Court] Frankenthal, Sept. 8, 2020, 
MULTIMEDIA UND RECHT [MMR] 85, 85–86 (2021) (referring to Facebook’s Community 
Standards); see also Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Higher Regional Court] Dresden Dec. 11, 
2019, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR URHEBER- UND MEDIENRECHT RECHTSPRECHUNGSDIENST [ZUM-
RD] 2, 3–4 (2021) (considering No. 12 of Facebook’s Community Standards and No. 3.2 
of its Terms of Service); OLG Nürnberg, ZUM-RD 16, 20 (stating that users’ obligations 
are circumscribed in Facebook’s Terms of Service and further defined in the Community 
Standards). 
239 BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], §§ 305–10, translation available at 
https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_bgb/ [https://perma.cc/BGC6-C7QV]. 
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book’s Community Standards on hate speech; this provision is nei-
ther “surprising,”240 “opaque,”241 nor “disproportionate.”242 To 
name a few examples, Facebook deleted the following posts based 
on its Community Standards; these deletions were approved by  
German courts in all five cases: 
“From the experience made so far with Islam, the one more other 
less, it is probably very clear that this human race243 does not fit into 
the European culture.”244 
 
240 OLG Dresden, NJW 3111, 3113 (2018); OLG Dresden, ZUM-RD 2, 3–4; 
Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Higher Regional Court] Karlsruhe Feb. 28, 2019, MULTIMEDIA 
UND RECHT [MMR] 52, 54 (2020); see also Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Higher Regional 
Court] Stuttgart Sept. 6, 2018, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR URHEBER- UND MEDIENRECHT [ZUM] 273, 
276 (2019). A “surprising clause” is invalid pursuant to BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH 
[BGB] [CIVIL CODE], § 305c, para. 1. 
241 OLG Dresden, NJW 3111, 3113; OLG Karlsruhe, MMR 52, 54; Oberlandesgericht 
[OLG] [Higher Regional Court] Nürnberg, Aug. 4, 2020, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR URHEBER- UND 
MEDIENRECHT RECHTSPRECHUNGSDIENST [ZUM-RD] 16, 24–25 (2021); Landgericht [LG] 
[Regional Court] Stuttgart, Aug. 29, 2019, MULTIMEDIA UND RECHT [MMR] 423, 423–24 
(2020); Landgericht [LG] [Regional Court] Bremen June 20, 2029, MULTIMEDIA UND 
RECHT [MMR] 426, 428 (2020); see also OLG Stuttgart, ZUM 2019, 273, 276; 
Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Higher Regional Court] Dresden, June 16, 2020, MULTIMEDIA 
UND RECHT [MMR] 58, 59 (2021) (on Facebook’s Terms of Service). An “opaque clause” 
is invalid pursuant to BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], § 307, para. 1, 
sentence 2. 
242 OLG Dresden, NJW 3111, 3113–14 (2018); OLG Nürnberg ZUM-RD 16, 24; OLG 
Karlsruhe, MMR 52, 54; LG Bremen, MMR 426, 428; see also OLG Stuttgart, ZUM 273, 
277 on Facebook’s Terms of Service). A disproportionate clause is invalid pursuant to 
BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], § 307, para. 1, sentence 1. 
243 It is worth mentioning here that the German word “Rasse” is arguably used differently 
in the German language than the word “race” in English. In Germany, that word is rather 
taboo, probably because it was a frequently used term by the Nazi Regime for its inhuman 
ideology. This association is why some have called for removing that term from the 
German constitution. Hui Min Neo, Row in Germany over ‘Race’ in Constitution, 
BARRON’S (June 12, 2020), https://www.barrons.com/news/row-in-germany-over-race-in-
constitution-01591947605 [https://perma.cc/6NYH-ELCP]. So, too, the federal 
government agreed on replacing that term in the constitution (“Rasse”-Begriff soll aus dem 
Grundgesetz gestrichen werden, DUEUTSCHE WELLE (March. 5, 2021), 
https://www.dw.com/de/rasse-begriff-soll-aus-dem-grundgesetz-gestrichen-werden/a-
56787404 [https://p.dw.com/p/3qGzs]. 
244 OLG Dresden, NJW 3111, 3112 (confirming the removal, as the statement assumes 
that the claimed inferiority is related to their uniform genetic disposition and is, therefore, 
unchangeable). 
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“Refugees: detain until they voluntarily leave the country!”245 
“As Nostradamus said: over the sea they will come like locusts, 
but they will not be animals…how right was the man.”246 
“We owe nothing to the Africans and Arabs. They have de-
stroyed their continents by corruption, sloppiness, unrestrained re-
production, and tribal and religious wars, and now they are taking 
away from us what we have diligently built.”247 
“You [i.e., Chancellor Merkel] have intentionally and unlaw-
fully imported terror, war, poverty, and death by illegal asylum-free-
loaders, hundreds of thousands of mercenaries, IS terrorists and 
other serious criminals into our country…. Public events now have 
to be massively secured, fenced in and secured by policemen with 
machine guns because of YOUR ILLEGAL GUESTS. Now there 
are protection zones for women who seek shelter from those seeking 
protection, so that they do not continue to become victims of sexual 
assault through YOUR DISINHIBITED GUESTS. Every day 
YOUR GUESTS commit violent crimes.”248 
However, one court ruled that an expression of opinion permit-
ted by law could not be removed on the basis of community stand-
ards which it deemed void.249 Other courts strongly disagree with 
 
245Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Higher Regional Court] Karlsruhe, June 25, 2018, NEUE 
JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 3110, 3111 (2018) (confirming the removal, as the 
statement went beyond “mere criticism and discussion of the immigration laws”). 
246 Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Higher Regional Court] Stuttgart, Sept. 6, 2018, 
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR URHEBER- UND MEDIENRECHT [ZUM] 273, 276 (2019) (confirming the 
removal, because the post equates refugees with locusts, i.e., masses of voracious vermin). 
247 OLG Karlsruhe, MMR 52, 53 (confirming the removal, as the statement ascribed 
moral deficits to these people on the sole basis of their membership of the ethnic group). 
248  OLG München, MMR 79, 81–82 (confirming the removal, holding the post an 
incitement of masses under STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB] [PENAL CODE], § 130 because all 
asylum seekers are described without differentiation as freeloaders and serious criminals. 
Thus, the post denies the social claim to human dignity. Moreover, this statement may, on 
the one hand, promote aggression towards certain people and, on the other, fear or 
insecurity among those). 
249 Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Higher Regional Court] München, Aug. 24, 2018, NEUE 
JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 3115, 3116 (2018). Confirmed by OLG München, 
ZUM 548, 554–57 (holding valid, however, Facebook’s contractual authority to ban 
hatred); Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Higher Regional Court] München, Jan. 7, 2020, 
MULTIMEDIA UND RECHT [MMR] 79, 81–82 (2021); Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Higher 
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this notion because hate speech threatens to “brutalize morals,” 
which might have a general negative impact on the exchange of 
opinions via social networks and, thus, also calls the business model 
of a social network into question.250 Consequently, platforms must 
be allowed a certain margin of discretion.251 German courts are, 
therefore, somewhat inconsistent as regards the extent to which so-
cial media providers can regulate content posted on their platforms. 
Provided the self-imposed standards are valid, courts evaluate 
whether a post infringes those guidelines. One court, for instance, 
held that the statement, “I cannot compete with you argumenta-
tively, you are unarmed and that would not be very fair of me” does 
not violate Facebook’s Community Standards.252 Another court in-
terpreted YouTube’s Community Guidelines on hate speech rather 
narrowly, concluding that the term “knife immigration” (“Messer-
Einwanderung”) may imply that refugees commit acts of violence 
using knives but does not stir up hatred against persons on account 
of their origin.253 Moreover, a court found the “Erklärung 2018” 
(“Declaration 2018”), a petition criticizing mass immigration, not to 
be hate speech and, thus, the declaration permissible.254 Likewise, 
the satiric recommendation for voters of Germany’s far-right party 
 
Regional Court] München, Feb. 18, 2020, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR URHEBER- UND MEDIENRECHT 
RECHTSPRECHUNGSDIENST [ZUM-RD] 8, 13 (2021). Nonetheless, the court allowed 
Facebook to remove hate speech infringing its Community Standards. Id. at 85. Other 
courts agreed that an expression of opinion permitted by law cannot be removed on the 
basis of community standards but considered those terms and conditions valid nonetheless. 
Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Higher Regional Court] Oldenburg, July 1, 2019, MULTIMEDIA 
UND RECHT [MMR] 41, 42 (2020); Landgericht [LG] [Regional Court] Bamberg Oct. 18, 
2018, MULTIMEDIA UND RECHT [MMR] 56, 58 (2019). 
250 OLG Karlsruhe, MMR 52, 53; Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Higher Regional Court] 
Dresden Aug. 8, 2018, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 3111, 3114; see also 
Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Higher Regional Court] Dresden, Apr. 7, 2020, MULTIMEDIA 
UND RECHT [MMR] 626, 626 (2020); LG Stuttgart, MMR 423, 425 (2020); Landgericht 
[LG] [Regional Court] Bremen, June 20, 2020, MULTIMEDIA UND RECHT [MMR] 426, 428 
(2020). 
251 Landgericht [LG] [Regional Court] Frankenthal, Sept. 8, 2020, MULTIMEDIA UND 
RECHT [MMR] 85, 86 (2021). 
252 OLG München, NJW 3115, 3117 (2018). In the case of an unjustified ban, German 
courts grant a claim for remediation. See infra Section IV.B. 
253 Kammergericht [KG [Higher Regional Court] Mar. 22, 2019, MULTIMEDIA UND 
RECHT [MMR] 47, 48 (2020). 
254 LG Bamberg, MMR 56, 58–59. On the Declaration, see Erklärung 2018, WIKIPEDIA, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Erkl%C3%A4rung_2018 [https://perma.cc/Y95X-MUJ7]. 
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to sign their ballots (which would void them under German law), 
ending with a winking emoticon, could not be banned by Twitter.255 
After all, German courts have so far been more concerned with 
validity, interpretation, and application of the self-imposed stand-
ards than with the NetzDG, highlighting the greater importance of 
these questions in legal practice compared to the NetzDG. However, 
the self-imposed standards do not cancel out the NetzDG. Notably, 
the social networks must still observe NetzDG’s deadlines—e.g., to 
process a user complaint. 
B. Unjustified Bans 
Even though the deletion of content, which is neither prohibited 
by the self-imposed standards nor covered by the NetzDG, is to be 
reduced as much as possible, the question arises whether users can 
demand remediation. Under current US law, they cannot (provided 
that the platform acted in good faith),256 whereas the legislative ma-
terials on the NetzDG allude to such a claim.257 Although it is not 
explicitly stated, German courts grant such claims based on general 
principles of law. If a ban is unjustified, they confer a claim based 
on the contract between the user and the social network, which is 
concluded upon the registration of a personal profile on the plat-
form, without evaluating the provider’s good faith.258 Additionally, 
courts can grant an interim injunction in order to enforce the claim 
 
255 Landgericht [LG] [Regional Court] Nürnberg-Fürth, June 7, 2019, MULTIMEDIA UND 
RECHT [MMR] 541 (2019). 
256 CDA § 230. 
257 Gesetzentwurf der Fraktionen der CDU/CSU und SPD [Governing Caucuses’ Draft] 
DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG: DRUCKSACHEN[BT]18/12356, 23 (stating that nobody need 
accept that their legitimate statements are removed from social networks). 
258 See e.g., Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Higher Regional Court] München, Jan. 7, 2020, 
MULTIMEDIA UND RECHT [MMR] 79, 83 (2021); Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Higher 
Regional Court] Dresden, Apr. 7, 2020, MULTIMEDIA UND RECHT [MMR] 626, 626 (2020); 
Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Higher Regional Court] München, Jan. 7, 2020, ZEITSCHRIFT 
FÜR URHEBER- UND MEDIENRECHT [ZUM] 548, 560 (2020); KG MMR 47, 47 (2020); 
Landgericht [LG] [Regional Court] Frankfurt, Sept. 3, 2020, KOMMUNIKATION & RECHT 
[K&R] 128, 129–30 (2021). On conclusion of contract see Oberlandesgericht [OLG] 
[Higher Regional Court] Dresden, Aug. 8, 2018, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 
[NJW] 3111, 3112 (2018); Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Higher Regional Court] München, 
Aug. 24, 2018, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 3115, 3116 (2018); 
Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Higher Regional Court] München, Feb. 18, 2020, ZEITSCHRIFT 
FÜR URHEBER- UND MEDIENRECHT RECHTSPRECHUNGSDIENST [ZUM-RD] 8, 13 (2021). 
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rapidly.259 That claim also applies to unjustified blockings based on 
NetzDG. 
 
V. CONTROVERSIES ABOUT REGULATING SOCIAL MEDIA 
Much of the NetzDG criticism reflects concerns over the general 
external regulation of social media.260 Therefore, it is a suitable fo-
rum for discussing this approach. 
A. Deserved Control 
The NetzDG is based mainly on the consideration that illegal 
circumstances are perpetuated more strongly on the Internet than in 
traditional media261 due to the “effects of defamation on the Internet, 
especially given the ease, scope and speed of the dissemination of 
information.”262 Today, this is even more accurate than twenty-five 
years ago when CDA Section 230 was enacted.263 Nowadays, many 
applicants for jobs are first Googled and searched for on social net-
works.264 “The anonymity, amplification, and aggregation possibil-
ities offered by the Internet have allowed private actors to discrimi-
nate, harass, and threaten vulnerable groups on a massive scale.”265 
At the same time, a study in 2020 showed that social media may 
affect real-life actions by proving links between online posts and 
anti-refugee incidents in Germany.266 
 
259 E.g., OLG München, NJW 3115, 2018; Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Higher Regional 
Court] Oldenburg, July 1, 2019, MULTIMEDIA UND RECHT [MMR] 41 (2020); OLG 
Dresden, MMR 626 (2020); LG Nürnberg-Fürth, MMR 541 (2019). 
260 It is, for instance, generally concerned that a legal obligation to ban certain content 
would result in excessive censorship. See, e.g., McMillan, supra note 9, at 265. 
261 Gesetzentwurf der Fraktionen der CDU/CSU und SPD [Governing Caucuses’ Draft] 
DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG: DRUCKSACHEN[BT]18/12356, 21. This is criticized as to CDA 
Section 230. Saint, supra note 83, at 44 (“Internet defamation has a far greater potential to 
harm than defamation in printed materials.”). 
262 Magyar Tartalomszolgáltatók Egyesülete and Index.hu Zrt v. Hungary, App. No. 
22947/13 (2016), [https://perma.cc/QDK6-F9XS]. 
263 See Chu, supra note 83 (providing several instances for how the Internet and its use 
have changed over time, concluding that this demands a change in law as well). 
264 Citron & Wittes, supra note 47, at 412. 
265 Citron & Franks, supra note 79, at 19. 
266 Karsten Müller & Carlo Schwarz, Fanning the Flames of Hate: Social Media and 
Hate Crime, J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N, at 2 (2020). 
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Unfortunately, sometimes platforms do not treat all users 
equally, but rather privilege celebrities. For example, Facebook 
privileged then-presidential candidate Donald Trump during his 
2016 campaign by leaving posts which had clearly violated the plat-
form’s standards untouched.267 Facebook has since been severely 
criticized for being too lenient with Trump.268 A law could prevent 
that. Additionally, it would provide a complementary remedy based 
on the provider-imposed standards for cases in which the internal 
regulation fails for whatever reason. And even though some users 
might be more willing to accept content moderation based on rules 
they consented to when initially creating an account,269 a law en-
acted by Congress would put content removals on a democratic foot-
ing.270 
B. Cheapest Cost Avoider 
From an economic point of view, accountability of Internet in-
termediaries is grounded on the notion of the cheapest cost avoider 
or least-cost avoider.271 It should be noted that the party who can 
prevent the infringement by the simplest and most convenient means 
is the posting user.272 However, if that party de facto cannot be held 
 
267 Supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
268 Id. 
269 Supra Part IV. 
270 Wu, supra note 38, at 2022 (“Nor can we ignore the fact that what counts as acceptable 
speech for billions of people around the world is currently being decided by a relatively 
small group of private actors in Northern California.”). 
271 See Ronald J. Mann & Seth R. Belzley, The Promise of Internet Intermediary 
Liability, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 239, 307 (2005) (concluding that “[w]hen 
intermediaries have the technological capability to prevent harmful transactions and when 
the costs of doing so are reasonable in relation to the harm prevented, they should be 
encouraged to do so—with the threat of formal legal sanction if that becomes necessary.”); 
Ronen Perry & Tal Zarsky, Liability for Online Anonymous Speech: Comparative and 
Economic Analyses, 5 J. EUR. TORT L. 205, 205–06 (2014) (concluding that imposing 
liability on the provider is most efficient if the posting user is unavailable). 
272 Gerhard Wagner, Haftung von Plattformen für Rechtsverletzungen (Teil 1), 
GEWERBLICHER RECHTSSCHUTZ UND URHEBERRECHT [GRUR] 329, 338 (2020); see also 
Kosseff, supra note 45, at 152 (“Although it is easier––and possibly more lucrative––to 
sue the website on which defamatory content appeared rather than an anonymous 
individual, it is fairer to seek compensation from the individual who actually created the 
allegedly harmful content…. Imposing liability on intermediaries, rather than on the parties 
who created the content, does not adequately accomplish [protecting individuals’ interests 
and maximizing society’s benefits].”). 
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liable for reasons of anonymity and/or enforcement difficulties, the 
service providers are targeted.273 They must stop the infringement 
to avert further damage that outweighs the costs of content modera-
tion. Apart from the overall problem that a judgment against the 
posting user often comes too late and is difficult to enforce in other 
countries, German law explicitly provides for anonymity on the In-
ternet.274 NetzDG can be regarded as a counterweight of this. 
C. Potential Over-blocking (Collateral Censorship) 
A major concern about requiring Internet providers to engage in 
content moderation by law is referred to as collateral censorship: “A 
censors B out of fear that the government will hold A liable for the 
effects of B’s speech.”275 Likewise, the most common criticism of 
NetzDG is the risk of over-blocking due to the threat of fines of up 
to €50 million, which would provide an incentive for deletion in 
 
273 Balkin, supra note 45, at 434 (“Not only are these entities likely to have deeper 
pockets, they are also probably easier to find.”); Wu, supra note 44, at 300 
(“[I]ntermediaries can control the speech they carry. Moreover, they can easily be 
identified, unlike users, who might use pseudonyms and communicate online without 
directly identifying themselves. Intermediaries can easily be sued, unlike users who might 
reside in a foreign jurisdiction, outside the reach of U.S. courts.”). 
274 Telemediengesetz [TMG] [Teleservices Act], § 13, para. 4; see Wagner, supra note 
272, at 337; Spindler, supra note 127, at 373. One court, however, ruled that a social 
network is entitled, in order to prevent unlawful behavior, to require the use of real names 
and to block the user account in the event of violations. OBERLANDESGERICHT [OLG] 
[HIGHER REGIONAL COURT] München, Dec. 8, 2020, 18 U 2822/19 Pre (2020). 
275 Jack M. Balkin, Free Speech and Hostile Environments, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2295, 
2296 (1999); see also Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 333 (4th Cir. 1997) 
(“Because service providers would be subject to liability only for the publication of 
information, and not for its removal, they would have a natural incentive simply to remove 
messages upon notification, whether the contents were defamatory or not.”); Balkin, supra 
note 45, at 436 (“The same is true for online versions of newspapers and magazines which 
now allow readers to respond by posting comments. Without section 230, many website 
operators would simply disable these features.”); Note, supra note 45, at 2036 (“[E]xposing 
internet intermediaries to liability for defamation communicated by their users would lead 
to collateral censorship.”); Wu, supra note 44, at 308 (“[W]hen faced with liability for 
carrying particular content, the intermediary continues to have an incentive to censor when 
the original speaker would not, because it loses little or nothing for doing so, while the 
original speaker loses all of the benefits of that content.”). 
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questionable cases.276 In the legislative process, this concern was al-
ready addressed by the Bundesrat.277 Nevertheless, the government 
intended to reduce the risk of over-blocking by allowing social net-
works to solicit a statement from the user and, if necessary, an ex-
ternal expert’s opinion.278 
Some have expressed doubts about the thesis of over-blocking 
early on.279 After all, as shown above, only a systematic violation 
leads to a fine.280 Besides, the data provided by transparency reports 
does not indicate an excessive deletion of content.281 A study on the 
effect of NetzDG within the first six months concluded that the Act: 
[H]as not provoked mass requests for takedowns. 
Nor has it forced Internet platforms to adopt a ‘take 
down, ask later’ approach…. At the same time, it re-
mains uncertain whether NetzDG has achieved sig-
 
276 Spindler, supra note 127, at 366; Liesching, supra note 126, at 27; Guggenberger, 
supra note 167, at 2580; Sebastian Müller-Franken, Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz: 
Selbstbehauptung des Rechts oder erster Schritt in die selbstregulierte Vorzensur? – 
Verfassungsrechtliche Fragen, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR DAS GESAMTE MEDIENRECHT [AFP] 1, 8–
10 (2018); Karl-Heinz Ladeur & Tobias Gostomzyk, Das Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz 
und die Logik der Meinungsfreiheit, KOMMUNIKATION & RECHT [K&R] 390, 392–93 
(2017); Diana Lee, Germany’s NetzDG and the Threat to Online Free Speech, Yale L. Sch. 
Media & Freedom Info. Access Clinic (Oct. 10, 2017), https://law.yale.edu/mfia/case-
disclosed/germanys-netzdg-and-threat-online-free-speech [https://perma.cc/QTD3-
U99K]; Kaye, supra note 18, at 4; Kaye, Wir schaffen das!, supra note 90; McMillan, 
supra note 9, at 265, 287 (“The Network Enforcement Act is not proportionate because it 
provides every incentive to over-police content with no oversight, and no equivalent 
incentive to ensure that lawful content is not deleted….Although no evidence of over-
blocking has yet been found, there is a real concern that it may occur.”). 
277 Regierungsentwurf [Cabinet Draft], DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG: 
DRUCKSACHEN[BT]18/12727, 16–17. 
278 Gesetzentwurf der Fraktionen der CDU/CSU und SPD [Governing Caucuses’ Draft] 
DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG: DRUCKSACHEN[BT]18/12356, 23. 
279 E.g., Schiff, supra note 155, at 370; Karl-Nikolaus Peifer, 
Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz: Selbstbehauptung des Rechts oder erster Schritt in die 
selbstregulierte Vorzensur? – Zivilrechtliche Aspekte, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR DAS GESAMTE 
MEDIENRECHT [AFP] 14, 19–20 (2018). 
280 See discussion supra Section III.E. 
281 See Löber & Roßnagel, supra note 133, at 73; Schmitz-Berndt & Berndt, supra note 
111, at 36. 
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nificant results in reaching its stated goal of prevent-
ing hate speech. Evidence suggests that platforms are 
wriggling around strict compliance.282  
Similarly, court rulings to date do not indicate that the platforms 
block excessively or systematically and unjustifiably.283 Addition-
ally, it should be noted that German courts, generally speaking, 
grant a claim for remediation,284 which considerably reduces the in-
centive to delete content in case of doubt. It has been countered that 
this put-back claim is too weak because it does not accord damages 
and an interim injunction might come too late for urgent news.285 
Yet, several published judgments show that some users take ad-
vantage of that claim by suing social networks,286 which puts pres-
sure on those providers. More importantly, social media cannot af-
ford removing content arbitrarily and on too large of a scale.287 For 
economic reasons, they must find an appropriate balance of banning 
daunting posts and keeping decent content in order to maintain a 
pleasant environment.288 
In sum, the initial fear appears unfounded.289 
 
282 Echikson & Knodt, supra note 215, at i. 
283 See discussion supra Section IV.A. 
284 See discussion supra Section IV.B. 
285 Gerhard Wagner, Haftung von Plattformen für Rechtsverletzungen (Teil 2), 
GEWERBLICHER RECHTSSCHUTZ UND URHEBERRECHT [GRUR] 447, 452 (2020). 
286 See supra Section IV.A. 
287 But see Wu, supra note 44, at 308 (“Thus, within limits, intermediaries can likely 
obtain all or most of the advertising revenue they would otherwise obtain, while still 
censoring speech.”). 
288 Supra notes 236–237 and accompanying text. 
289 Christoph Buchert, Ein Gewinn für den Rechtsstaat, LEGAL TRIB. ONLINE (Oct. 26, 
2019), https://www.lto.de/recht/hintergruende/h/pro-contra-netzdg-ein-gewinn-fuer-den-
rechtsstaat/ [https://perma.cc/D63N-8VXR]; Daniel Holznagel, Put-back-Ansprüche 
gegen soziale Netzwerke: Quo Vadis?, COMPUTER UND RECHT [CR] 518, 523 (2019); Rolf 
Schwartmann & Robin L. Mühlenbeck, NetzDG und das virtuelle Hausrecht sozialer 
Netzwerke, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR RECHTSPOLITIK [ZRP] 170, 170 (2020); Gesetzentwurf der 
Fraktionen der CDU/CSU und SPD [Governing Caucuses’ Draft] DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG: 
DRUCKSACHEN[BT]19/17741, 42; Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung [Cabinet Draft], 
DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG: DRUCKSACHEN[BT]19/18792, 16. An evaluation commissioned 
by the Federal Ministry of Justice in 2020 came to the same conclusion. EIFERT ET AL., 
supra note 204, at 78–80, 91. 
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D. Chilling Effect 
Others have argued that the NetzDG may have a chilling effect 
on users, as users may fear removal of their posts and, thus, shy 
away from making any statements.290 This would be particularly 
problematic in view of the (fundamental) right to Freedom of Ex-
pression. 
However, if this effect existed, it would be based on irrational 
and erratic user behavior because they face liability regardless of the 
NetzDG, which does not change the assessment of the criminal or 
other liability for statements.291 The risk of criminal prosecution is 
much more serious than that of blocking a post. It would, therefore, 
be incomprehensible if users were to refrain from posting content 
just because of the NetzDG. At best, it is conceivable that users 
might fear that their accounts will be blocked or suspended. Yet, this 
measure is not provided for by the NetzDG but can only be imposed 
on the basis of self-imposed standards.292 
In its recent draft amendment, the German federal government 
contended that people affected by hate speech on the Internet might 
get deterred from social or political commitment, or even withdraw 
from discussions which would have a negative impact on the Free-
dom of Expression.293 A Pew Research survey of 4,248 US adults 
found that 27% of the participants back off from posting online after 
witnessing the harassment of others and 13% ceased using Internet 
services after witnessing harassing actions.294 Similarly, according 
 
290 Nunziato, supra note 9, at 1535; Müller-Franken, supra note 276, at 10; McMillan, 
supra note 9, at 265; Zipursky, supra note 9, at 1359. 
291 Schmitz-Berndt & Berndt, supra note 111, at 28; Matthias Friehe, Löschen und 
Sperren in sozialen Netzwerken, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 1697, 1698 
(2020). 
292 See discussion supra Part IV. One court concluded that even the possibility of user 
account deactivation due to hate speech and support of hate organizations under a social 
network’s terms and conditions does not create a chilling effect. Oberlandesgericht [OLG] 
[Higher Regional Court] Dresden, June 16, 2020, MULTIMEDIA UND RECHT [MMR] 58, 60 
(2021). 
293 Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung [Cabinet Draft], DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG: 
DRUCKSACHEN[BT]19/18792, 1, 15. 
294 See Maeve Duggan, Online Harassment 2017, PEW RSCH. CTR. (July 11, 2017), 
https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2017/07/11/online-harassment-2017/ 
[https://perma.cc/H935-DKKE]; see also Citron & Wittes, supra note 47, at 410, 420. 
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to a 2019 survey by the Institute for Democracy and Civil Society 
of 7,349 German Internet users, when faced with hate speech on the 
Internet, 54% of respondents were less likely to express their politi-
cal opinion and 47% were less likely to participate in discussions on 
the Internet.295 Given that only 8% of respondents in that study had 
already been personally affected by hate speech online and 40% had 
observed it, the study concluded that people are both systematically 
driven out of online discussions by hate speech and allow them-
selves to be driven out, even if they have not (yet) been personally 
attacked.296 However, from the percentage of affected respondents 
(54%),297 it follows that general knowledge about the mere existence 
of hate speech might discourage people from expressing their opin-
ion online. This results in the exact opposite chilling effect. 
E. Privatization of Decision-Making 
A central point of criticism is the privatization of decision-mak-
ing, since it is not the courts that rule on the admissibility of a post 
but private companies.298 It is argued that private players are unable 
to examine facts and engage in a complex balancing of factors, such 
as Freedom of Expression and Right of Personality, in a short period 
 
295 Daniel Geschke et al., Institut für Demokratie und Zivilgesellschaft, #Hass im Netz: 
Der schleichende Angriff auf unsere Demokratie 2 (June 2019), https://www.idz-
jena.de/fileadmin/user_upload/_Hass_im_Netz_Executive_Summary.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/6P49-YZQU]. 
296 Id. at 1–2. 
297 Id. at 2. 
298 Guggenberger, supra note 126, at 100; Stephan Koloßa, Facebook and the Rule of 
Law, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES ÖFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VÖLKERRECHT [ZAÖRV] 
509, 523–24 (2020); Lee, supra note 276; Kaye, Wir schaffen das!, supra note 90; 
Zipursky, supra note 9, at 1359 (“[I]t is not the German government, but the intermediaries, 
that are making the decisions of what can be deleted. NetzDG does not give social media 
platforms a clear picture of which content violates German law. As a result, social media 
providers are the ones making the value judgments on what to delete from their deletion 
centers.”). 
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of time.299 That would be associated with a lack of due process.300 
In this regard, the UN Special Rapporteur David Kaye also opined, 
“The liability placed upon private companies to remove third party 
content absent a judicial oversight is not compatible with interna-
tional human rights law.”301 
That said, this criticism does not consider the fact that the com-
panies must make their own decisions, as they already do based on 
their own guidelines.302 Under CDA Section 230––the antithesis to 
the NetzDG––platforms also have the power to decide. For instance, 
within the boundaries of good faith, they can block completely legal 
and harmless statements.303 It is not the NetzDG that gives the plat-
forms this power, but their structural characteristic as a platform. 
Moreover, under German law, the final decision always remains 
with the courts because users are entitled to remediation for unjusti-
fied bans.304 This compensates for a potential deficit in due process. 
Thus, external regulation should not only be perceived as vesting 
power in Internet providers—it also imposes restrictions on the pro-
viders by significantly limiting their power. Furthermore, with re-
spect to NetzDG, this argument ignores the fact that platforms are 
obligated to take measures anyway under existing German law and 
thus completely disregards the Act’s mode of operation.305 
 
299 Daphne Keller & Paddy Leerssen, Facts and Where to Find Them: Empirical 
Research on Internet Platforms and Online Speech, in SOCIAL MEDIA AND DEMOCRACY. 
THE STATE OF THE FIELD AND PROSPECTS FOR REFORM 220, 221 (Nathaniel Persily & 
Joshua A. Tucker eds., 2020) (“Evidence suggests that platforms don’t do a great job as 
enforcers of speech rules. Even when they apply their own, self-defined Community 
Guidelines, the results often appear erratic.”). 
300 Balkin, supra note 9, at 2031; see also Müller-Franken, supra note 276, at 7. 
301 Kaye, supra note 18, at 4. 
302 Peifer, supra note 279, at 20. 
303 CDA Section 230 does not contain any restriction in that respect. Supra note 36 and 
accompanying text. 
304 Martin Eifert, Rechenschaftspflichten für soziale Netzwerke und Suchmaschinen. Zur 
Veränderung des Umgangs von Recht und Politik mit dem Internet, NEUE JURISTISCHE 
WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 1450, 1451 (2017); see also Schiff, supra note 155, at 368. 
305 Stefan Niggemeier, Der übertriebene Hass auf das Anti-Hass-Gesetz, ÜBER MEDIEN 
(Jan. 8, 2018), https://uebermedien.de/24310/der-uebertriebene-hass-auf-das-anti-hass-
gesetz/ [https://perma.cc/N9M8-DPSD]. 
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As an alternative to the NetzDG, some propose to strengthen 
criminal law enforcement with increased human resources.306 Alt-
hough this seems generally worth supporting, the question arises as 
to why this is necessary in relation to social networks. Why should 
taxpayers be burdened and social networks relieved when such com-
panies are known to be eager to avoid taxes?307 It is not the state or 
the taxpayers who are at the root of the problem, but the platforms. 
Therefore, they must also bear the cost of solving it. 
As another alternative, it is proposed that the law be amended so 
that removal and blocking under the NetzDG can only be carried out 
with the consent of a judge.308 Some countries already take this ap-
proach.309 That said, it should be reiterated that, firstly, both the user 
and the reporting person can bring an action under German law, and, 
secondly, judicial consent was not required under the law which was 
already in existence before the NetzDG.310 This was neither pro-
vided for in the procedure envisaged by the Federal Court of Justice 
nor by the Telemediengesetz on the liability of a host provider.311 
Moreover, this proposal would also cost taxpayers a lot of money. 
Similarly, the third proposed alternative is to issue preliminary 
injunctions rapidly as under unfair competition law.312 However, 
this would pose an additional problem: who should have standing to 
 
306 Guggenberger, supra note 126, at 101; see also Johanna Spiegel & Britta Heymann, 
Ein Minenfeld für Anbieter sozialer Netzweke – Zwischen NetzDG, Verfassungsrecht und 
Vertragsfreiheit, KOMMUNIKATION & RECHT [K&R] 344, 349 (2020) (proposing that 
platforms may refuse to take action against content which is not manifestly illegal because 
users could seek help from criminal authorities). 
307 See, e.g., Chloe Taylor, Silicon Valley Giants Accused of Avoiding $100 Billion in 
Taxes over the Last Decade, CNBC (Dec. 2, 2019, 9:44 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/ 
2019/12/02/silicon-valley-giants-accused-of-avoiding-100-billion-in-taxes.html 
[https://perma.cc/VM5Y-EMPA]. 
308 Nima Mafi-Gudarzi, Desinformation: Herausforderung für die wehrhafte 
Demokratie, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR RECHTSPOLITIK [ZRP] 65, 68 (2019). 
309 Keller & Leerssen, supra note 299, at 224; Lei No. 12.965, de 23 Abril de 2014, 
DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 4.24.2014, art. 19 (Braz.) (“[T]he provider of 
Internet applications can only be subject to civil liability for damages resulting from 
content generated by third parties if, after a specific court order, it does not take any steps 
to…make unavailable the content that was identified as being unlawful, unless otherwise 
provided by law.”). 
310 Schmitz-Berndt & Berndt, supra note 111, at 27, 38. 
311 Telemediengesetz [TMG] [Teleservices Act], § 10. 
312 Spindler, supra note 127, at 371; Guggenberger, supra note 126, at 101. 
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file an application for an injunction if no individual’s legal interests 
are affected, for instance, in a case of the use of symbols of uncon-
stitutional organizations? If numerous complaints were filed regard-
ing the same post at the same time, different courts might decide 
differently on a single post. The problem may also arise with unfair 
competition because any competitor can apply for an injunction.313 
However, there are often many more platform users than competi-
tors. If a politician posts something, an exceptionally large number 
of users might find it offensive. If the decisions were to be made as 
quickly as according to the NetzDG, courts would be under consid-
erable time pressure in light of the large number of controversial 
posts. For blocking purposes, it would be sufficient if only one court 
were to consider the content illegal. This would not prevent over-
blocking. 
F. Expenditures 
Obliging social media providers to take action inevitably comes 
along with incurring costs. In view of the occasionally stringent reg-
ulatory requirements imposed by NetzDG, some feared that the 
costs for social networks could become too high.314 However, after 
implementation, this has not been found.315 
In the explanatory part of the initial NetzDG draft, the German 
government estimated that each social network would face addi-
tional annual expenditures of €28 million.316 But in reality it is dif-
ficult to capture how high this expenditure truly is. Google em-
ployed sixty-five people to deal with NetzDG complaints in the sec-
ond half of 2019 and twice hired an external law firm during that 
 
313 GESETZ GEGEN DEN UNLAUTEREN WETTBEWERB [UWG] [ACT AGAINST UNFAIR 
COMPETITION], § 8, para. 3, no. 1, translation available at https://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/englisch_uwg/englisch_uwg.pdf [https://perma.cc/PB5U-C5JC]. 
314 E.g., Opinion on the Draft of the Network Enforcement Act, supra note 131, at 11. 
315 See Löber & Roßnagel, supra note 133, at 74. 
316 Gesetzentwurf der Fraktionen der CDU/CSU und SPD [Governing Caucuses’ Draft] 
DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG: DRUCKSACHEN[BT]18/12356, 2. 
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period.317 Facebook employed 125 people in that period and con-
sulted external lawyers in fourteen cases.318 More than seventy  
people worked for Twitter, some of whom are employed by external 
service providers; external bodies were consulted on nineteen  
complaints.319 
None of this seems unreasonable or undue. After all, it is the 
platforms that benefit from posted content. For example, “Facebook 
exercises government-like powers, even though it is not a govern-
ment: it is a private, for-profit company largely controlled by a sin-
gle individual, whose primary objective is not necessarily to serve 
the public interest of his political community.”320 Moreover, the In-
ternet has left its infancy. While potential liability can burden and 
inhibit an Internet provider in its initial phase, this danger is now 
much less compelling.321 The networks have become so large that 
they can handle the extra effort. In addition, experience in dealing 
with content moderation has already been gathered from which les-
sons can be learned. If start-ups need to be protected, they may be 
exempted from regulation, as outlined in the NetzDG. 
G. NetzDG’s Miscellaneous Controversies 
Further discussions about the NetzDG, which are not particu-
larly relevant for the regulatory approach as such, are not addressed 
by this Article. However, this criticism shall not be concealed. The 
 
317 See Removals Under the Network Enforcement Law, supra note 160. 
318 See NetzDG Transparency Report, FACEBOOK (Jan. 2020), https://about.fb.com/wp-
content/uploads/2020/01/facebook_netzdg_January_2020_english.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4CK7-X8Y8]. 
319 See Twitter Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetzbericht: Juli - Dezember 2019 [Twitter 
Network Enforcement Law Report], TWITTER (Dec. 2019), https://cdn.cms-
twdigitalassets.com/content/dam/transparency-twitter/data/download-netzdg-
report/netzdg-jul-dec-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/RXU2-6SGA]. 
320 Francis Fukuyama & Andrew Grotto, Comparative Media Regulation in the US and 
Europe, in SOCIAL MEDIA AND DEMOCRACY: THE STATE OF THE FIELD AND PROSPECTS FOR 
REFORM 210 (Nathaniel Persily & Joshua A. Tucker eds., 2020). 
321 Citron & Wittes, supra note 47, at 410–11; see also Fair Hous. Council v. 
Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1164 n.15 (9th Cir. 2008) (“The Internet is no 
longer a fragile new means of communication that could easily be smothered in the cradle 
by overzealous enforcement of laws and regulations applicable to brick-and-mortar 
businesses.”). 
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NetzDG controversy also revolved around legislative powers322 and 
the Act’s compatibility with European law.323 Moreover, there are 
often complaints about problems in the interpretation of the 
NetzDG, such as the definition of the term “social network.”324 
 
322 Germany has a federal system with legislative powers accorded to both the federal 
state and the states. The sixteen states have the right to legislate insofar as the constitution 
does not confer legislative power on the federal state. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW], 
Art. 70, para. 1. As for the NetzDG, the federal government invokes its competence both 
for public welfare and for law relating to economic matters. Id. at art. 74, para. 1, nos. 7, 
11; see Gesetzentwurf der Fraktionen der CDU/CSU und SPD [Governing Caucuses’ 
Draft] DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG: DRUCKSACHEN[BT]18/12356, 13. Most scholars disagree 
and consider the states competent. See e.g., Spindler, supra note 127, at 366; Liesching, 
supra note 126, at 26; Kalscheuer & Hornung, supra note 126, at 1724–25; Ladeur & 
Gostomzyk, supra note 276, at 390–91. Contra Schiff, supra note 155, at 366–67. 
Nonetheless, in its two proposals to amend the NetzDG from February and April 2020, the 
government maintains its assertion. See Gesetzentwurf der Fraktionen der CDU/CSU und 
SPD [Governing Caucuses’ Draft] DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG: DRUCKSACHEN[BT]19/17741, 
19; Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung [Cabinet Draft], DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG: 
DRUCKSACHEN[BT]19/18792, 19. 
323 In that regard, two questions arise. Firstly, a violation of Art. 3(2) of the E-Commerce 
Directive is seen in the fact that the NetzDG applies to networks based in other EU member 
states and lays down stricter rules than the respective country of domicile. E-Commerce 
Directive, supra note 117, at art. 3(2) (“Member States may not, for reasons falling within 
the coordinated field, restrict the freedom to provide information society services from 
another Member State.”); see also Spindler, supra note 127, at 367; Guggenberger, supra 
note 167, at 2581; Liesching, supra note 126, at 29. With respect to YouTube, Facebook, 
and Twitter, the European country of domicile is Ireland. The German government invokes 
an exception provided by the directive, claiming the NetzDG is necessary for public policy 
reasons, “in particular the prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal 
offenses, including the protection of minors and the fight against any incitement to hatred 
on grounds of race, sex, religion or nationality, and violations of human dignity concerning 
individual persons.” Gesetzentwurf der Fraktionen der CDU/CSU und SPD [Governing 
Caucuses’ Draft] DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG: DRUCKSACHEN[BT]18/12356, 14; E-
Commerce Directive, supra note 117, at art. 3(4)(a), no. i.; see also Patrick Nölscher, Das 
Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz und seine Vereinbarkeit mit dem Unionsrecht, ZEITSCHRIFT 
FÜR URHEBER- UND MEDIENRECHT [ZUM] 301, 307–11 (2020). Secondly, a potential 
conflict arises with article 14 of the E-Commerce Directive, according to which a host 
provider must act “expeditiously to remove or to disable access to the information.” E-
Commerce Directive, supra note 117, at art. 14(1)(b). Some assume that NetzDG’s rigid 
time limit for manifestly unlawful content is repugnant to that provision. Guggenberger, 
supra note 167, at 2579. Contra Nölscher, supra, at 303–06. 
324 E.g., Spindler, supra note 127, at 367–68. 
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Some even consider NetzDG unconstitutional because of its inde-
terminacy and vagueness.325 
 
VI. A NETZDG FOR THE UNITED STATES? 
Currently, the United States takes the exact opposite approach 
of the NetzDG. This continues to be widely supported326 and aligns 
with the US legal tradition to reduce regulation and place great em-
phasis on free speech. The United States may take a different ap-
proach in terms of copyright infringement, where the law implies 
obligations for service providers upon obtaining knowledge, aware-
ness, or notification to act expeditiously to remove or disable access 
to infringing material.327 However, social media content moderation 
concerns the constitutional right of free speech, which is even more 
significant in the United States than in Germany. As opposed to ar-
guably most Western Democracies, the United States is traditionally 
reluctant to implement laws against hate speech and, for instance, 
do not outlaw Holocaust denial, notwithstanding the fact that the 
cruel mass murder of Jews by the Nazi regime is not in dispute.328 
Many of the statements considered unlawful in Germany might be 
permissible in the United States under the First Amendment.329 Ac-
cordingly, in 2010, Congress enacted the Securing the Protection of 
our Enduring and Established Constitutional Heritage (“SPEECH”) 
Act, declaring foreign judgments based on defamation lawsuits un-
enforceable in US courts, unless either the foreign legislation offers 
at least as much free speech protection as the United States or the 
defendant would have been found liable under US law as well.330 
 
325 Marc Liesching, Was sind “rechtswidrige Inhalte” im Sinne des 
Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetzes?, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR URHEBER- UND MEDIENRECHT [ZUM] 
809, 813–14 (2017); Liesching, supra note 126, at 26–27. Contra Schiff, supra note 155, 
at 371. Some doubt the Act’s constitutionality in that regard. Ladeur & Gostomzyk, supra 
note 276, at 391–92. 
326 See sources cited supra notes 45, 69. 
327 17 U.S.C. §§ 512(c)(1)(A)(iii)–(C). 
328 Kenneth Lasson, Holocaust Denial and the First Amendment: The Quest for Truth in 
a Free Society, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 35, 72 (1997) (arguing that Holocaust denial should 
not be protected under the First Amendment). 
329 Lee, supra note 276; see also Balkin, supra note 9, at 2032 (“Americans generally 
have a much more libertarian free speech policy than the rest of the world.”). 
330 H.R. 2765, 111th Cong. (2010) 
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Nonetheless, there is a vigorous debate both in legal academia 
and in politics.331 Politicians from both sides attack, for different 
reasons, the blanket immunity.332 Some voices demand complete 
freedom on social networks, whereas others want exactly the oppo-
site—more regulation. Should the latter prevail, could the current 
debate result in a “US NetzDG”? In order to pursue this question, 
the constitutional framework will be examined, mainly shaped by 
the freedom of speech. Subsequently, this Article makes policy con-
siderations based on experiences with the German NetzDG. 
A. “New Governors” under the First Amendment 
Guaranteeing free expression, enshrined in the First Amend-
ment,333 is one of the most famous, prominent, and important 
achievements of the US Constitution. “[T]he right to exercise the 
liberties safeguarded by the First Amendment ‘lies at the foundation 
of free government by free men.’”334 The German Federal Constitu-
tional Court found a similar characterization for the Freedom of Ex-
pression.335 Nonetheless, the value attached to this right in the 
United States exceeds the already remarkable significance in other 
countries, with many statements that are considered unlawful else-
where being permissible here.336 The right to free speech applies to 
all different kinds of media communication,337 including the “world 
of ideas,”338 i.e., social media. Thus, posts and comments on social 
network platforms are “entitled to the same First Amendment pro-
tections as other forms of media.”339 
 
331 See discussion supra Section I.B. 
332 Id. 
333 U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law…abridging the freedom of 
speech….).” 
334 Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509 (1946) (quoting Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 
147, 161 (1939)). 
335 See supra Section II.C.2. 
336 See supra notes 328–329 and accompanying text. 
337 See Brown v. Ent. Merchants Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 790 (2011) (holding that video 
games are protected speech under the First Amendment). 
338 Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1732 (2017) (referring to social media 
as “world of ideas”). 
339 Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 928 F.3d 226, 237 (2d 
Cir. 2019) (quoting Packingham, 582 U.S. at 1735–36). 
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What makes social media a little more interesting is whether the 
First Amendment is also binding the platforms acting as “de facto 
governments.” Thus, social media users could assert their free 
speech liberty against the platforms. Thus, those “New Gover-
nors,”340 being bound by that fundamental right, could not invoke it 
themselves.341 
As a matter of principle, only state institutions are committed by 
constitutional fundamental rights. However, it can be argued that 
Facebook is tantamount to a government due to its outstanding role 
over modern communication. Facebook’s CEO Mark Zuckerberg 
said, “In a lot of ways Facebook is more like a government than a 
traditional company. We have this large community of people, and 
more than other technology companies we’re really setting poli-
cies.”342 This own insight could support the notion that Facebook 
resembles a government. 
Yet, the Supreme Court is extremely cautious in imposing con-
stitutional obligations on private parties. Through the state action 
doctrine, the US Constitution applies only to government, and not 
private, actors.343 The Court examines private conduct as to whether 
“the private entity has exercised powers that are ‘traditionally the 
exclusive prerogative of the State.’”344 In a landmark decision from 
1946, Marsh v. Alabama, the Court applied the First Amendment to 
distribution of religious materials on the premises of a privately 
owned company town.345 Interestingly enough, it held that 
“[o]wnership does not always mean absolute dominion. The more 
an owner, for his advantage, opens up his property for use by the 
public in general, the more do his rights become circumscribed by 
 
340 Klonick, supra note 21. 
341 See id. at 1613. 
342 Franklin Foer, Facebook’s War on Free Will, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 19, 2017), 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/sep/19/facebooks-war-on-free-will 
[https://perma.cc/64RL-ME2Y]. 
343 Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 360, 411 (2019) (“[T]he Free 
Speech Clause prohibits only governmental abridgment of speech. The Free Speech Clause 
does not prohibit private abridgment of speech….”). 
344 Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1005 (1982) (quoting Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 
419 U.S. 345, 353 (1974)). 
345 Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509 (1946). 
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the statutory and constitutional rights of those who use it.”346 And 
social networks are indeed opening up widely to the public, which 
suggests that they must respect their users’ rights. 
Initially, the Court distinguished traditional media from the In-
ternet, holding that “special justifications for regulation of the 
broadcast media…are not present in cyberspace” because “the In-
ternet can hardly be considered a ‘scarce’ expressive commodity” 
so as to the Court’s “cases provide no basis for qualifying the level 
of First Amendment scrutiny that should be applied to this me-
dium.”347 Albeit this early holding in 1997, the current Supreme 
Court stresses social media’s impact on free speech matters. Re-
cently, in Packingham v. North Carolina from 2017, it ruled that 
social media was a “protected space” for lawful speech under the 
First Amendment, voiding a North Carolina statute that prohibited 
sex offenders from accessing social media platforms which permit 
minors to become members.348 That state law strove to prevent sex 
offenders from contacting children online.349 Yet, the mere access 
to social media is protected under the First Amendment: 
Social media allows users to gain access to infor-
mation and communicate with one another about it 
on any subject that might come to mind…. By pro-
hibiting sex offenders from using those websites, 
North Carolina with one broad stroke bars access to 
what for many are the principal sources for knowing 
current events, checking ads for employment, speak-
ing and listening in the modern public square, and 
otherwise exploring the vast realms of human 
thought and knowledge. These websites can provide 
perhaps the most powerful mechanisms available to 
a private citizen to make his or her voice heard. They 
 
346 Id. at 506. 
347 Reno v. Am. Civ. Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 868, 870 (1997). 
348 Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017). 
349 Id. 
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allow a person with an Internet connection to ‘be-
come a town crier with a voice that resonates farther 
than it could from any soapbox.’350 
From those remarks, some might infer a First Amendment com-
mitment, given social media’s special role with respect to statements 
of opinion.351 However, the defendant in that case was the govern-
ment, not a platform. 
Furthermore, in an even more recent decision, the Supreme 
Court once again narrowed exceptions to its state action doctrine.  
In Manhattan Community Access Corp. v. Halleck, a ruling along 
ideological lines, the Court’s conservative majority held that public 
access television, operated through a private nonprofit corporation 
which had been designated by New York City, is not subject to First 
Amendment commitment.352 The Court summarized that, according 
to its case law, a private entity can only be considered a state actor 
in a few instances, such as when it has an exclusive public function 
or when the government exerts strong influence.353 However, 
“merely hosting speech by others is not a traditional, exclusive pub-
lic function and does not alone transform private entities into state 
actors subject to First Amendment constraints.”354 What makes the 
judgment even more important for social media is that the Court ex-
plicitly allows a private party for an “appropriate editorial discretion 
within [its] open forum.”355 Thus, the Halleck precedent speaks not 
only firmly against social platforms’ obligations under the First 
 
350 Id. at 1733. 
351 See, e.g., Klonick, supra note 21, at 1611–13 (“Future litigation might use 
Packingham’s acknowledgment of a First Amendment right to social media access as a 
new basis to argue that these platforms perform quasi-municipal functions….The Court’s 
new definition in Packingham of online speech platforms as forums…might threaten the 
viability of arguments that these companies have their own First Amendment rights as 
speakers.”). However, Klonick concludes that courts are unlikely to treat social media 
platforms as state actors. Id. at 1658–59. 
352 Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1933 (2019). 
353 Id. at 1928 (“Under this Court’s cases, a private entity can qualify as a state actor in a 
few limited circumstances—including, for example, (i) when the private entity performs a 
traditional, exclusive public function…(ii) when the government compels the private entity 
to take a particular action…or (iii) when the government acts jointly with the private 
entity.”). 
354 Id. at 1930–31. 
355 Id. 
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Amendment but also in favor of an authority to decide which content 
they ban and which they don’t—based on their dominion. 
Moreover, the Halleck Court ruled that “the fact that the govern-
ment licenses, contracts with, or grants a monopoly to a private en-
tity does not convert the private entity into a state actor—unless the 
private entity is performing a traditional, exclusive public func-
tion.”356 Hence, even if the federal government considered Face-
book, for instance, a monopoly under law for sharing user generated 
content online, that mere fact would not expose the site to a First 
Amendment commitment. 
After all, even if some find it appropriate and desirable from a 
policy perspective to bring social media providers under free speech 
scrutiny, there is simply very little indication that the Supreme 
Court—notwithstanding its contemplation of social media’s im-
portance but in the face of its reluctance to expand the state action 
doctrine—would be willing to take that approach.357 Therefore, it 
must be acknowledged that Packingham was a unanimous judgment 
whereas Halleck was a 5-4 decision. Yet, the three concurring Jus-
tices in Packingham358 then went on to vote in line with the other 
two conservative Justices in Halleck, who had not participated in 
Packingham,359 building a front against expanding the state action 
doctrine. This fact stresses Halleck’s relevance. 
Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that recent case law does 
have an impact on governmental content moderation. In Knight First 
Amendment Institute v. Trump, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
 
356 Id. at 1931. 
357 See Eric Goldman, Private Publishers Aren’t State Actors–Manhattan Community 
Access v. Halleck, TECH. & MKTG L. BLOG (June 26, 2019), 
https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2019/06/private-publishers-arent-state-actors-
manhattan-community-access-v-halleck.htm [https://perma.cc/5VSH-QRG7]; see also 
Evelyn Douek, COVID-19 and Social Media Content Moderation, LAWFARE (Mar. 25, 
2020),  https://www.lawfareblog.com/covid-19-and-social-media-content-moderation 
[https://perma.cc/Y4PC-YRRW] (“Of course, platforms are not the government and are 
not bound by the First Amendment.”); Citron & Franks, supra note 79, at 15, 17 
(“Attempting to extend First Amendment obligations to private actors is not only 
constitutionally incoherent, but endangers the First Amendment rights of private actors 
against compelled speech.”). 
358 Being Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito and Thomas. 
359 Being Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh. 
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held that, pursuant to the First Amendment, the President, acting in 
their official role and not as a private party, shall not delete com-
ments on their tweets or ban other users from accessing their ac-
count.360 However, this judgment only concerned the government 
acting on Twitter, not Twitter itself acting. 
B. Social Media’s Free Speech 
Concluding that social media providers’ content moderation is 
not subject to First Amendment scrutiny inevitably results in recog-
nizing platforms’ entitlement to free speech. Yet, scope and extent 
of that right are in dispute. 
In that context, one could think of Miami Herald v. Tornillo, a 
Supreme Court decision from 1974, to undergird and enhance social 
media’s shield against any governmental interference.361 Here, the 
Court unanimously struck down the “right of reply” under a Florida 
statute, which conferred power on political candidates to answer 
criticism and attacks by a newspaper in that newspaper and, thus, 
violated the First Amendment’s guarantee of a free press.362 An im-
portant rationale, on which the Supreme Court grounded its finding, 
resembles an argument against excessive banning of content: a right 
of reply could have chilling effects on newspapers since, in the face 
of potential claims for responses, they might refrain from criticism 
of politicians, which then “dampens the vigor and limits the variety 
of public debate.”363 Similarly, some suppose that content modera-
tion prompts users to fear removal and, thus, to shy away from mak-
ing any statements on social media.364 Yet, this Article has already 
refuted that assumption.365 
Furthermore, negative content moderation can hardly be com-
pared to a right of reply in newspapers. While a newspaper indeed 
 
360 Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 928 F.3d 226, 236 (2d 
Cir. 2019) (“In sum, since he took office, the President has consistently used the Account 
as an important tool of governance and executive outreach. For these reasons, we conclude 
that the factors pointing to the public, non-private nature of the Account and its interactive 
features are overwhelming.”). 
361 Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). 
362 Id. at 258. 
363 Id. at 257. 
364 Supra Section V.D. 
365 Id. 
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may have a strong incentive to avoid replies by politicians as those 
replies take up space on the papers which blocks other articles or 
advertisements,366 there is no equivalent incentive in social media. 
More importantly, while a “newspaper is more than a passive recep-
tacle or conduit for news, comment, and advertising,”367 a platform 
is, by and large, exactly this.368 The resulting newspaper’s right of 
“choice of material to go into a newspaper,”369 hence, cannot apply 
to social media providers because platforms do not exercise a posi-
tive decision on what content they show but instead mainly render 
negative decisions on what content not to show. 
In sum, the broad right accorded by the Tornillo Court to news-
papers is not applicable to social media providers, since the latter do 
not face space limitations and publish user-submitted, rather than its 
own, content.370 In terms of free speech, we must distinguish be-
tween one’s own statements and other people’s statements that one 
allows to be broadcast. 
However, some maintain that “the First Amendment protects the 
right of those platforms to carry whatever content they see fit”371 or 
that “under First Amendment jurisprudence, any state-mandated 
censorship that occurs outside the context of a judicial determination 
of the content’s illegality…is an unconstitutional prior restraint on 
speech.”372 Yet, grounding the latter assertion on Bantam Books v. 
Sullivan373 seems questionable. That decision, handed down by the 
 
366 See Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 256. 
367 See id. at 258. 
368 See Tushnet, supra note 47, at 1012 (“Just as a telephone company is not engaging in 
speech of its own when its users speak, ISPs regularly facilitate others’ speech rather than 
speaking for themselves. As conduits, ISPs’ concerns are different than those of initial 
speakers.”); see also Klonick, supra note 21, at 1660 (“[P]latforms do not actively solicit 
specific types of content, unlike how an editorial desk might solicit reporting or journalistic 
coverage. Instead, users use the site to post or share content independently.”). 
369 See Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 258 (“A newspaper is more than a passive receptacle or 
conduit for news, comment, and advertising.”). 
370 See Frank Pasquale, Platform Neutrality: Enhancing Freedom of Expression in 
Spheres of Private Power, 17 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 487, 502–03 (2016) 
(distinguishing Google’s business from newspapers privileged by Tornillo). 
371 Fukuyama & Grotto, supra note 320, at 209. 
372 Nunziato, supra note 9, at 1537. 
373 See generally Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963); see Nunziato, 
supra note 9, at 1537–38 n.96. 
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Supreme Court in 1963, concerned allegedly “obscene, indecent or 
impure language” publications.374 Here, the state of Rhode Island 
had created a commission to “educate the public[,]…investigate and 
recommend the prosecution of all violations” in terms of those pub-
lications. The Court almost unanimously held that the ultimate pur-
pose “of the Commission’s notices was to intimidate distributors 
and retailers and that they had resulted in the suppression of the sale 
of the books listed.”375 Besides the fact that the decision was primar-
ily grounded in Fourteenth Amendment due process concerns,376 
distribution of books and other paper publications can hardly be 
compared to modern social media forums. Admittedly, the Court 
stated that “[t]he separation of legitimate from illegitimate speech 
calls for…sensitive tools.”377 Nonetheless, it iterated that the Con-
stitution does not protect obscenity.378  
Once again, the Court thus clarified that First Amendment pro-
tection is not absolute. If a statement or publication does not fall 
within the scope of the First Amendment, the publisher or distributer 
cannot invoke that fundamental right either. It follows that the First 
Amendment does in no way grant an unrestricted permission to pub-
lish or distribute whatever you want. Rather, Bantam Books, even 
though it was decided almost sixty years ago and dealt with paper 
publications, reminds us that regulating freedom of expression 
raises due process challenges, especially when determining the 
“finely drawn line”379 between free and illegitimate speech. 
Additionally, the Supreme Court’s ruling in Halleck does not 
stand in the way of a mandatory content moderation.  Indeed, the 
Court conferred “appropriate editorial discretion within [an] open 
forum,”380 however, upon “all private property owners and private 
lessees who open their property for speech.”381 Thus, the Court did 
not base its decision on the First Amendment. It rather left open the 
 
374 Id. at 59, 72. 
375 Id. at 58, n.1. 
376 See id. at 66, 71.  
377 Id. at 66 (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513, 525 (1958)). 
378 Id. at 65. 
379 Id. at 66. 
380 Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1931 (2019). 
381 Id. at 1930–31. 
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question of whether the First Amendment prevents the government 
from obliging private parties to open their property for speech by 
others and referred to Turner v. FCC from 1994.382 In that case, the 
Court found it constitutional to require cable systems to allocate a 
percentage of their channels to local public broadcast stations since 
those must-carry provisions were content neutral.383 
Albeit the US policy approach in CDA Section 230 to guard In-
ternet platforms against any liability for users’ disparaging 
speech,384 the First Amendment, according to the majority of US 
courts and scholars, does not require wholesale protection from all 
platform liability.385 Rather, the Act “reflects a ‘policy choice,’ not 
a First Amendment imperative.”386 The opposing view that the First 
Amendment requires an entire protection in order to avoid collateral 
censorship since “[w]ithout [that] constitutional rule, Internet inter-
mediaries would limit a significant amount of constitutionally pro-
tected speech”387 by opting for “the least costly method” of remov-
ing in case of doubt388 remains an unfounded assumption, neither 
 
382 Id. at n.2. 
383 See generally Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994). 
384 CDA § 230. 
385 See, e.g., Jane Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 29 (1st Cir. 2016); 
Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1020 (9th Cir. 2003) (“There is no reason inherent in the 
technological features of cyberspace why First Amendment and defamation law should 
apply differently in cyberspace than in the brick and mortar world. Congress, however, has 
chosen for policy reasons to immunize from liability for defamatory or obscene 
speech….”); Gucci Am., Inc. v. Hall & Assocs., 135 F. Supp. 2d 409, 421 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); 
Balkin, supra note 44, at 434 (“[Section 230] is not required by First Amendment 
doctrine.”); Nina I. Brown and Jonathan Peters, Say This, Not That: Government 
Regulation And Control Of Social Media, 68 SYRACUSE L. REV. 521, 539 (“This immunity 
[granted by Section 230] is not a constitutional grant. It comes from Congress, and 
Congress can take it away.”); Citron & Wittes, supra note 47, at 419; William H. Freivogel, 
Does the Communications Decency Act Foster Indecency?, 16 COMM. L. & POL’Y 17, 48 
(2011); Tushnet, supra note 47, at 988. For several examples for CDA Section 230 
extending beyond First Amendment protection, see Goldman, supra note 69, at 36–39. 
386 Gucci Am., Inc., 135 F. Supp. 2d at 421. 
387 Note, supra note 45, at 2035. 
388 Id. at 2038, 2043 n.140 (“[I]ncreased liability will increase the proportion of protected 
speech that is removed in an effort to reduce defamation.”). 
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supported by empirical data nor case law from Germany where con-
tent moderation is mandatory.389 What is more, a claim for remedi-
ation helps decrease the incentive to excessively delete content. 
C. Leeway for Regulation 
Although the broad protection granted by the Tornillo Court is 
not applicable to social media providers, the providers are generally 
entitled to free speech and not bound by the First Amendment. 
Hence, with respect to potential regulation of content on social me-
dia, both social networks and their users may assert First Amend-
ment protection against government interference. On the other hand, 
it does not compel an absolute and complete First Amendment pro-
tection. Firstly, it is not proven that the Supreme Court’s interpreta-
tion of that fundamental right enjoins any regulation of social media 
content. Rather, according to the prevailing view in the United 
States, the First Amendment does not require protection from all 
platform liability.390 Secondly, there are several categories of unpro-
tected speech—e.g., obscenity391 or fighting words.392 If those ac-
tions do not fall within the scope of users’ freedom of expression, 
consequentially, platforms cannot invoke any First Amendment pro-
tection either. Otherwise, the First Amendment would safeguard 
statements which it exempts form its realm at the same time. 
On the contrary, private property owners’ “appropriate editorial 
discretion within [their] open forum”393 lays a solid foundation for 
social media’s entitlement to impose rules and enforce them through 
content moderation. Moreover, governmental regulation of content 
moderation on social media platforms must both respect due process 
 
389 Firstly, excessive over-blocking can be discerned neither from the transparency 
reports’ data nor from case law on conducted bans. See discussion supra Section III.B.2, 
Sections IV.A.–B., Section V.C. Rather, judicial control and economic incentives strongly 
militate against such a phenomenon. See supra Section V.C. Secondly, the transparency 
reports’ data also show that the bulk of bans are due to the standards that the networks 
imposed themselves and not on German law. See supra Section III.B.2. 
390 Supra discussion Section VI.B. 
391 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 36 (1973) (“[O]bscene material is not protected by 
the First Amendment.”). 
392 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 569 (1942) (exempting “You are a God-
damned racketeer” and “a damned Fascist” from First Amendment protection). 
393 Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1931 (2019).  
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requirements under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment, respec-
tively, and guarantee that legitimate speech is not overly affected by 
measures against illegitimate speech, as can be inferred from case 
law. “[T]he Government ‘may not suppress lawful speech as the 
means to suppress unlawful speech.’”394 At the same time, it is 
worth noting that the  Supreme Court in Tornillo stated that media, 
even though entitled to First Amendment protection, to a certain  
extent must contribute to an environment of free speech (and, there-
fore, refrain from collaboration to constrain that freedom).395 
As one can see, any potential regulation of social networks’ con-
tent moderation lies within this constitutional area. Generally speak-
ing, there is much to suggest that moderate regulation of social me-
dia by compelling its providers to remove unlawful content can be 
reconciled with the First Amendment. 
D. Lessons from NetzDG and Potential Developments 
What could such a regulation look like? The United States can 
go two different ways, leading away from CDA Section 230. On the 
one hand, as called for by mostly conservative voices, the possibili-
ties for intervention by social networks can be limited. However, 
President Trump’s demands were crooked: he claimed free speech 
for himself, although he was obliged to grant it on social networks—
and had himself violated this fundamental right.396 More im-
portantly, platforms are entitled to free speech. So, if Twitter wants 
to comment on his post, it is protected by the First Amendment. Fur-
thermore, it would be dangerous not to fill the legal vacuum with 
voluntary content moderation. Many examples of Internet abuse 
 
394 Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1738 (2017) (quoting Ashcroft v. 
Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 255 (2002)). 
395 Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 252 (1974) (“That Amendment 
rests on the assumption that the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse 
and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public, that a free press is a 
condition of a free society. Surely a command that the government itself shall not impede 
the free flow of ideas does not afford non-governmental combinations a refuge if they 
impose restraints upon that constitutionally guaranteed freedom. Freedom to publish means 
freedom for all and not for some. Freedom to publish is guaranteed by the Constitution, but 
freedom to combine to keep others from publishing is not.” (quoting Associated Press v. 
United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945))). 
396 Supra note 360. 
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make content moderation indispensable, such as an editorial 
launched by the Los Angeles Times, allowing Internet users to edit 
it without limitations and resulting in people posting disparaging 
content and trolls publishing pornography.397 Without moderation, 
Internet platforms cannot remain a pleasant and enjoyable place. 
What is more, there would likely be chilling effects on expressing 
opinion on social media sites.398 
On the other hand, heightened regulation of social networks is 
conceivable in order to limit their leeway under CDA Section 230 
and make content moderation mandatory. The NetzDG can provide 
some guiding principles and mechanisms in this respect: (1) statu-
tory regulation based on the NetzDG model guarantees a certain 
equality of treatment among the platform users and (2) a remedy in 
cases of platforms’ failure to enforce their self-imposed standards. 
A minimum number of users can be made a prerequisite for appli-
cation in order to protect start-ups. Like the NetzDG, a regulation 
should oblige providers only with respect to already prohibited con-
tent. It might be retorted that this would raise the issue of dealing 
with fifty different jurisdictions in the United States.399 Therefore, a 
pragmatic approach could draw on categories of unprotected speech 
under the First Amendment.400 Under the status quo, statements 
which are supposed to be excluded from the First Amendment are 
actually de facto protected––on the Internet of all places, where con-
tent can be distributed widely and easily. At the very least, the most 
terrible content—such as revenge porn—should be excluded from 
the comprehensive protection.401 The exception of sex trafficking 
 
397 Grimmelmann, supra note 37, at 44–45. 
398 Supra Section V.D. 
399 Note, supra note 45, at 2036. To the contrary, in Germany, despite its federal system, 
all 16 states share the same civil and criminal law because it is enacted on the federal level. 
400 See Citron & Franks, supra note 79, at 21 (restricting immunity under CDA Section 
230(c)(1) to “speech” instead of “information”); supra Section VI.C. 
401 Unfortunately, revenge porn and nonconsensual pornography are covered by CDA 
Section 230’s blanket immunity. See Godaddy.com, LLC v. Toups, 429 S.W.3d 752, 760 
(Tex. 2013); see also Citron & Wittes, supra note 47, at 413 (listing revenge porn operators 
among providers who are immunized). An opposing view proposes to exclude websites 
from immunity that “purposely solicit the posting of revenge porn” as cocreators and 
invokes Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC; see Danielle 
Keats Citron & Mary Anne Franks, Criminalizing Revenge Porn, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
345, 359 n.86 (2014). 
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may serve as an example here.402 Additionally, these heinous acts 
have absolutely nothing to do with the First Amendment. In partic-
ular, sites that are designed to infringe rights should not be privi-
leged.403 Shielding those business models was not intended by the 
CDA.404 Interestingly enough, the DOJ’s September 2020 draft pro-
posed a transfer of the good faith requirement in CDA Section 230, 
subparagraph (c)(2)(A) to subparagraph (c)(1) and suggested clari-
fication of denying protection for purposefully harmful action pro-
viders.405 
That said, carving out several subject matters from CDA Section 
230’s immunity shall not result in the tort law dilemma that the act 
was intended to end.406 Therefore, a potential regulation should en-
sure that providers will only face damages, fines, or government in-
tervention in case of systematic violation. A mere claim for take 
down would already contribute significantly to help victims stop in-
fringements.407 
At the same time, any potential regulation on social media lia-
bility in the United States should draw its lessons from NetzDG’s 
flaws and shortcomings. For example, a complaint procedure should 
be open to every affected person, whether or not they are inside the 
 
402 CDA § 230(e)(5). The DOJ’s September 2020 draft proposed to further exempt 
terrorism, child sex abuse, and cyber-stalking from CDA Section 230’s immunity. SECTION 
BY SECTION, supra note 26, at 2. 
403 Citron & Wittes, supra note 47, at 417–18; see also Citron & Franks, supra note 79, 
at 22. 
404 Citron & Wittes, supra note 47, at 409, 416 (“Extending immunity to Bad Samaritans 
undermines § 230’s mission by eliminating incentives for better behavior by those in the 
best position to minimize harm.”). 
405 SECTION BY SECTION, supra note 26, at 2. The preceding Executive Order on 
Preventing Online Censorship had already requested this. Exec. Order No. 13925, 3 C.F.R. 
§ 34079 (2020). 
406 Citron & Franks, supra note 79, at 20–21; see discussion supra Section I.A. The 
DOJ’s draft of September 2020 intended to keep the overruling of that dilemma in its 
proposed paragraph (c)(1)(C). SECTION BY SECTION, supra note 26, at 1. 
407 See Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1031 n.19 (9th Cir. 2003) (“One possible solution 
to this statutorily created problem is the approach taken by Congress in the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act.”); cf. Tushnet, supra note 47, at 1013 (“[A] regime that limited 
available remedies against ISPs to injunctive relief—whether conditioned on compliance 
with notice-and-takedown, as with the DMCA, or as a blanket rule for ISPs that lacked 
actual knowledge of illegality—would substantially decrease the chilling effect on ISPs of 
altering § 230.”); Citron & Wittes, supra note 47, at 419. 
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social network. Furthermore, Congress should pay particular atten-
tion to the potential law’s scope if it decides to limit the application 
to only large providers, e.g., through a minimum number of users. 
In order to squash concerns about over-blocking, the Act should pro-
vide for a claim for remediation in case of unjustified bans.408 How-
ever, above all, the discussion should focus––more than in Ger-
many––on internal regulation because this approach is much more 
pivotal in practice.409 If the government does not want to dictate 
which statement is permissible and which is not, it can leave the 
details to the social networks, simply ensuring that standards are set 
and implemented. It should be noted that the NetzDG guarantees 




The German NetzDG takes a different approach to regulating 
hate speech than is currently seen in the United States. The effects 
of the Act are limited––both positive and negative. Court decisions 
as well as the published transparency reports show that, in practice, 
the provider-imposed standards play a greater role in removing posts 
on social networks than the NetzDG. Many fears were exaggerated 
or based on misunderstandings. The NetzDG seems to be a neces-
sary complement to the self-imposed standards of social networks. 
At the same time, it ensures a certain pressure on these platforms. 
Hence, the benefits of the Act outweigh its drawbacks. 
Therefore, the NetzDG can stimulate the debate in the United 
States: a regulation would have less dramatic consequences than 
many fear. Currently, CDA Section 230 appears somewhat out-
dated. When the law was enacted around twenty-five years ago, 
 
408 Tushnet, supra note 47, at 1014–15. 
409 Klonick, supra note 21, at 1666, 1670 (“Any proposed regulation…should work with 
an understanding of the intricate self-regulatory structure already in place in order to be the 
most effective for users and preserve the democratizing power of online platforms.”). 
410 See Kate Klonick, The Facebook Oversight Board: Creating an Independent 
Institution to Adjudicate Online Free Expression, 129 YALE L. REV. 2418, 2437 (2020) 
(“[A]s public pressure increased over the last ten years and as European nations, like 
Germany, forced Facebook to comply with their national speech laws, Facebook’s 
Community Standards became more restrictive and more similar to European standards.”). 
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many abuses and developments could not yet be foreseen. A reform 
initiative would face considerable resistance but would modernize 
US Internet law. Certain mechanisms of the NetzDG have already 
been proposed by legal scholars. Experience with the NetzDG  
supports these proposals. Requiring an upfront judicial consent to 
every blocking of content on a platform seems neither feasible nor 
suitable to keep the number of removals low. Rather, a combination 
of severe consequences for systematic violations and individual 
takedown claims in cases of legal infringements, securing a content 
removal in the event of failure of provider-imposed standards, seems 
desirable. Such a legal claim would possibly have helped Samantha 
Jespersen considerably. 
At the same time, the United States can learn from shortcomings 
of the NetzDG. Nonetheless, the main cautionary tale is the debate 
about the NetzDG––a discussion based on misconceptions, biases, 
and exaggerated assumed impacts. 
 
